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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: TOHARDS A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-l~AKING 
Nothing is so useful as a good theory. 
-Kurt Le\'ti n 
The good theory is useful as an aid in understanding the phenomenon 
of the empidc:al world. Understanding is aided by the generation 
of hypotheses about phenomenons which can be tested. If the 
hypothes is is confirmed, then we can cautiously hegin to genera li ze 
about the pheno10enon we observe ( Si nqer , 13) . 
Tvtelve years ago Sidney Verba wrote of the dismal state of 
political theory and of the contribution group theory could make : 
The i mmediate need in political research is not for 
more facts or more data : rather, it is for adequate 
conceptual schemes and systematic theories into 
which fit the facts we have and the facts we shal l gather 
in the future. ... Small qroup a.n:dysis can contribute 
to those broad theoretical ••. interes ts of political 
science (Ve rba~ 4). 
Thi.;; paper attempts to pt·ov·i de a sy~;temat i c t heory of group 
decision-making into vthich to fit facts \"le have concerning the 
Bay of Pigs and the Cuban ~l"issile Cr·is·is dedsions. 
The proces~ of fittinq the facts of past events into a 
theoretical fr·amm"ork i s, in ~J . D. Singer's \'lOI"ds, th<~ 11 ex post 
facto exper·i ment . 11 Events are not observed as they occur nor 
are variables controll ed during the occm·rence of the events. 
Ratherv the records, observations t end other tr~ccs of events 
are revi cv1ed ·in an effort to understand why and hov1 the event 
occurred as it did. 
Accord·i nq 'iy, t hi s paper beg·i nr. vd til an i nt 1·oducti on to the 
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forces shaping and limiting the study of political decision -
making. In Chapter Two a theory of the process of group decision -
making based on behavioral research is fonnulated. In subsequent 
chapters the theory is applied to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis decisions. Finally, the concluding chapter 
attempts to draw together· and to summat·i ze the theory and its 
application. 
The Jraditional ~1ach: The 11 Rational Act or ~1odel 11 
This study of poli t ical decision-making stressing the process 
of decision --making in a group sett ing is, in part, a reaction 
against traditi onal approaches of political rutalysis. 
The study of internuti onal rel ations is overburdened \'lith 
historical studies of the interaction bet\~een states. The classic 
appt·oach to the study of a given deci s ·ion by one govemment 
effecting anothcl· mi9ht be called the 11 rationa1 actor modcl 11 • 
Thi s mode l tr·eats the state as tiH~ entity reaching the decis ion. 
The decision itself is seen as behavi or that refl ect s a rational 
purpose or intent. The centra1 concepts of the model center· 
around the calcul ated \'le i ghing of goa·ls , alternati ves, consequences , 
and cho·ices. The .. rati onal actor' model" i s the dorrrinant method of 
current political analys i s (Snyders Bruck, and Snpin, 50 an d 
All s ion~ 38). 
I will i mp li citly contend in this paper th at the concept of 
for·~:rlgn poli cy as a r at'iona·l process of gatherin ~l in fot·mati on , 
sett in9 a ltemat·i ves ~ and making dec·is i ons i s not an ~.dequate 
2 
tool of understanding. In fact, the .. rational actor model .. does 
not make sense out of much political phenomenon (Gelb and Halperin, 
28). I will directly contend in this paper that a process model 
of political decision-making provides an adequate and helpful tool 
for the understanding of political decisions. 
The Process Model 
The focus of the process model is upon the individual decision-
makers in group settings and the process of interaction among them. 
Theorists in the fields of political science and psychology have 
contributed ideas which shape the process model. 
In the early sixties political scientists burst forth with 
a numbe1" of theories about the process of decision-making. Hhile 
differing on many impm~tant factors, these theor-ies shared some 
common ol'i entati ons \<Jhi ch differ fr·om the classic approaches. 
First, the focus was on the individual as deci sion-maker (Allison, 
144). The state was defi ned as its official decision-makers whose 
acts at~e the acts of the . state (SnydE! r, Bruck, and Sapi n, 65). 
The individual v1as recognized as operating in an organi zational 
and group context \'lhi ch shaped hi s behavior (Snyder, Bruck~ and 
Sapin, 103-"104 <tnd North, ct al, 10). 
A second change in politi cal thinking emphas ized by the 
process model is ·interaction among individuals in the decision -
making setting. Richard Neustadt's class i c study of Pres ident·ial 
power· focus ed upon the po\'Jer res ou nes ava'ilable to the decision-
ma~er. Nt~ustadt t~ecognized that thr. behaviot· of politic··llHlkers 
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is a result of pov1er interaction, not rational design (Neustadt, 
179-183}. Roger Hilsman, both before and after his service in 
the Kennedy admi ni strati on, deve 1 oped a mode 1 of po 1 i tics 'rlhi ch 
stressed the conflicts between decision-makers and the efforts 
to achieve consensus. For Hilsman, politics is the process of 
decision-making, of consensus building, and of conflict resolu- . 
tion in group settings (Hilsman, 1959, 365-366 and 1971, 117 and 
135). These political scientists brcv.ght new focus on the indi-
vidual as decision-maker and on p~ver as the means of conflict 
resolution and consensus building (Allison, 144-162). 
While some political scientists have recognized the impor-
tan ce of psychological considerations in understanding the indi-
vidual decision -maker (s ee North, et al, 9-10, for example), it 
was the psychologi sts who brought such considerat ions fully 
! 
into vi el'l. Ear 'ly work concet·ned with psychological factors v1as 
often nat·t·ow1y limited (Kelman , 1965, 4-7) and frequent ly of l ow 
qua 1 i ty {Rosenau, 509). Psycho 1 ogi s t Joseph de Ri veri a has 
exhaustively studied five major post-war decisions . De Ri veri a 
focused upon the individual decision-maker in a group setting 
(de Riveria, 212-213). His work provi des support for the focus 
upon the indi vi dual as the central decision-maker. De Riveria 
asserted that the extern a 1 forces and ,~at i on a 1 cons iderations of 
the cl ass ic approach are relevant only as seen through the eyes 
of the deci s ion -make r (de Riveria, 11-17) . 
De Riveri a •s \•lark \'l as heavi ·ly infl uenced by an earli er ~;tudy 
by ,Jerome Frank. Frank •s analysi s \'las mot·e ori ented tuwards the 
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interaction betv1een states than towards the psychology of individual 
decision-makers; h~1ever, Frank offered many psychological insights 
relevant to an understanding of the individual as decision-maker 
(Frank, 6). 
Frank and de Riveria suggest a third principle for the process 
model. The process of power exercise takes place within a pet·cep-
tual context v-Jhich individuals largely create themselves. 
De Riveria's book exerted some influence of its own on Irving 
Janis. Janis' book uses five post-\'tar political decisions as the 
substance of his analyses. Janis is much less theoretically 
analytical than de Rivel'ia or Frank. His theory is simply that 
amiability or cohesiveness in a group of po 1 icy-makers reduces 
independent thinldng and results in i1·rational and dehumanizing 
actions (Janis , 1972, 198-199). Thus, Janis suggests a fourth 
principle of the process model: the perceptual context of decis ion 
is shaped by the cohesive gt·oup. 
Thus, t he process model di ffers ft·om the 11 rational actor 
model" in stressing four concepts. First, the ind·i vi dua~ on-
maker is the foca1 point of study. Second, the exercj.sa.Qj~1er 
~...._ .. _, ...,.--...-.----.. -, ___ ____ 
is the means of conflict resolution and consensus building which 
.. -· . .. -------··--·-------------
is the essence of political decision-making. Third, the exerci se 
r' " ... - ,,_ ... , • •. ~..-· · -..,.. ••• , ,.,,._,._ --... ,,~, -• -., 
of po·net· takes place within a perccpt_u_(!_l ~ontext large ly cteated 
by ·indivi duals. Fourth~ in dividual s create this perceptual 
conte'xt \'li thin cohes ive groups. These four concepts form the 
basis of the process model and \'Jill be developed in Chapte r ·f\·10. 
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The~ of Pigs anq the Cuban_ f·1issile Crisis: 
The Limitations of App lication 
History depends on who writes it. 
-John Kennedy 
The inaccuracy of most \4ashi ngton diaries 
and autobiographies is surpassed only by 
the irrmodesty of their authors. 
-Theodore Sorensen 
Taken together, the statements by Kennedy and Sorensen are 
notable because the bulk of history about the foreign policy of 
the Kennedy administration Has \'lritten by members of the Adminis-
tration . Information on the Kennedy years is primarily based 
upon books by Schlesinger, Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, Hilsman, 
Salinger, and a deluge of less figures, including cooks, maids, 
secrctari es, et cetet·a. Only recently have books dra\'li ng on 
intervie\·ls of less sympathetic insidet"S surfaced (for examp le, 
those by Halbersttam and Allison). 
The res ult of the r·ather one-sided version of history on the 
Kennedy ye ars is a schol ar·ly skepticism and caution. Certai nly, 
one cannot take the t ationalized t1·eatment given to Bay of Pigs 
by most Kennedy insiders as l"eflective of the actual course of 
events. One learns t o t ake vlith appr·opriate amounts of salt the 
fuithfu 'l accounts by Sorensen, \'rith appropriate t-es pect tile more 
ins·ightful accounts by Schlesinge1·, and with app1·opri ate p·leasure 
the more critical accounts by Ha.l berstt am and ~Ja lton. In short , 
all the ne ces sary ctata may not ba available, but certainly enough 
data are available to test a theory. 
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But 'tlho \'/rites the history is not so important as who 
interprets the data. Allison's use of three different conceptual 
models in studying the missile crisis well illustrates the impor-
tance of finding the best way to look at the same set of events. 
Janis has taken a perspective which applies group dynamics theory 
to a series of political decisions. Sorensen argues that one 
cannot validly apply research fru~ the more mundane aspects of 
life to the exalted setting of Presidential decision-making 
(Sorensen, 1963, 11-12). 
The appropriateness of application of research data taken 
from various settings to the arena of Presidential decision -making 
is SQ~ething of a mute point . Sidney Verba, after spending a 
thi1·d of his book just ifying limited application, ends by saying 
something \'lhicll sounds like "if the shoe fits ••. " (Vet ba , 61-109). 
Vetba's case for trying the shoe on goes as follows: 
One of the standa1·ds ty which the applicab ility 
of the research in one area to an other can be judged is whether or not the findin gs in one 
area confir·m gene ral theories developed in the 
other. Propositions developed on the basis of 
studies in one field of social research gain 
greater vali dity if they can be fitted into 
systematic theories developed in anothe r field 
(Verba, 101). 
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OiAPTER II 
A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING 
I speak without exaggeration \'/hen· I say that 
I have constructed three thousand different 
theories .... Yet in only two cases did my 
experiments prove the truth of my theory. 
-Thomas Edison 
Hopefully, this theory wi 11 reflect more success than the 
2,998 failures of Thomas Edison. The theory outlined below is 
aimed at providing greate r understanding of the process by which 
a group reaches a specific decision. 
An understanding of the process of group decision-making 
might Hell begin vii th the end and work backwards tovtards the 
beginning. The idea behind this back\'lardness is that if vte knao'l 
at what point the group is and from what point it stat·ted, then 
vte might knm·1 hov1 it got there. The pt~ocess of unde1·standing 
has three steps. 
(1) Cohes ive groups develop pressures towards uni f ormity 
of opinion on any given issue. 'fhe group arrives at th·is end 
by the appli cation of conformity pressures on deviant members. 
(2) The direction of the conformity pressures is determined 
by the effective exercise of pm·ter \'li th in the gl'oup. That is, 
confot'ini ty pr·ess ures v1i 11 be brou9ht to bear upon the \'Ienker 
member-s by the more pm·;e!~ful members. Those \'!ho exercise greatest 
pm-1er \'li 11 determine the parti cul al' goa i t oward Hhi ch conformity 
\'l'i 11 be directed. Those \':ho possess less po'lter \'Ji 11 be pressured 
;; 
to conform in the direction of the position of the powerful. 
(3) The effective exercise of pm'ler is determined by indivi-
dual and group perceptions and expectations. First, the individual 
power holder must perceive that an opportunity for power exercise 
exists. We must feel that we can use our pO't'ter towards some parti-
cular end. Second, the individual must exercise power only in 
appropriate situations if the exercise of power is to be effective. 
Our roles, patterns of interaction, and psychological ori entations 
limit the 11 rightness" or appropriateness of power usage. Th ·ird, 
the individual must perceive the exercise of power to be, on 
bal ance , desirub le. 
In short, in cohesive groups the end of the decision process 
is conformity. The di rection of confonnity press ures is deter~ 
mined by the effective exercise of povte t'. And the exercise of 
pm'let~ is, in tlml, determined by i ndi vi dua 1 and group perceptions 
and expectations. 
Cohesi ve . Group~ ~l2P.. f.!:_~ssures_ Towards_ 
Con fol~m·t t.l_ _gf Opi n·t on_~! G1 ven _I_E_s_ue 
Our wretched spcci es is so made that those 
who \ltalk on the 'llell ~ trodden path al l'lays 
thl'OI·J stones at t hose who are sh01.,ring a nm-1 
road. 
- Voltaire 
The process of stone" t hrovling i s a l ess subtle form of 
conformity press uring than t hat employed by most groups. Con·· 
fonnity is si rnp'ly t he uniformity of opinion amonu membe rs in a 
group. Cohes i vcness i s t he sum of an tile bonds l'lh i ch attract an 
9 
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individual to the group. Cohesiveness might include, but is not 
limited to, identification \·lith the group, interpersonal attraction 
within the group, the desirability of the group's activities, et 
cetera. While we may not be able to precisely measure cohesiveness, 
we have a clear idea of its broad nature (CartHright, 91; Festinger, 
1968, 185; and Collins and Guetzkow, 129-130}. Becnuse the indi-
vidual \'lishes to remain in a group he .is subject to pressut·es to 
conform. Cohesion is, then, the source of a group's power to force 
confot111i ty. 
The proposition that individuals tend to conform to the 
opinions of the group is one of the best documented generalizations 
in small group resenrch l iterature. In both on~going and experi-
menta 1 gr·oups, researchers have found that i ndi vi dua 1 s wi 11 change 
thei l' vi C\'15 to confonn to the dominant group opinion. Conformity 
results regardl ess of the 11 correctness11 Ol" validity of the group 
opinion (Verlia, 22 and Janis, 1972, 5). He are clearly reluc-tant 
to stand alone against the opinions of our peers. 
A wide variety of research datu supports the conclusion that 
cohesiveness increases conformity in gt .. oups. ~1embers of mO\"e 
cohesive groups both more readily initi ate and accept infl uence 
attempts than members of 1 css cohes ive groups . The cohesive group,, 
then, attempt s more conformi ty pressutes than the non-cohesive 
group. And. in turn , the membc1·s of the cohes ive gr·oup respond 
more ,~eadily to the increased pressures for unifonnity (Cartwright, 
104; Collins and Guetzkm-1, 129- 130 ; Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 
152·· 164; Schachte r, 1 65~ 1 66; nnd Festinqct·, 1968, 185 ). 
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Increases in Cohesiveness 
Cohesiveness increases if the group shares a common fate 
or experiences increased stress. 
(1) Research of groups sharing a common fate points to an 
increase in interpersonal attractiveness and thus cohesiveness. 
Similarly, if the group is treated as an entity in terms of 
external re\'tards or punishments, group cohesiveness will increase 
(Collins and Guetzkow, 140- 143). The cohesion-building effects 
of shared fate are demonstrated by the closeness of oppressed 
groups \'lho are treated as an entity by the oppressors. 
(2) Leaders of nations wishing to avoid the pitfalls of their 
follies are fond of creating or using a crisis in order to solidify 
the nation around them. Actually, this process is an example of 
the cohesion-building qualities of increased stress . A mass of 
t•esearch data points to increases in group solidarity, integration, 
cooperation, friendliness, et cetera, in response to stressful 
situations (Janis, 1968, 80; Hambin, 221; and Lanzetta, 217). 
Research by Hambin, however, seems to contradi ct the p1·evious 
studies by showing a decrease in group integration or cohesiveness 
during a cris is. In seeking to explain the unexpected results, 
Hambin r-evi ei·ted the previous li tet~ature. The rcviev1s and llambin's 
own study point to an increase in cohesiveness during a crisis 
only if a likely cooperati ve solution is pet'ceived by the group. 
If a li kely solution is unavailable, the cohesiveness \'Jill decl'ease 
(llambin, 230) . 
11 
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Increases in Conformity Pressures on the De vi ant 
Conformity pressures on the deviant increase with the impor-
tance ot relevance of the issue, the discrepancy of opinion, and 
the status of the deviant. 
( 1) Conformity .eressures 2!!. th~ de vi ant increase ~ the 
relevance and importance of.. the issue to the group increases. 
The relevance and importance of an issue for a group is a matter 
of ordering priorities. Regardless of the basis for the ordering, 
the group clearly exercises greater influence in matters perceived 
as relevant to the group {Schachter, 166 and Festinger, 1968, 184). 
Less relevant or less important issues probably do not offer as 
great a possibility for conflict over basic values, goals, or 
perceptions as do i ssues of more centrul concern. 
(2) .£onformity "ressures on _!:Jle deviant increase~ ~ceived 
deviance .inc.!:_(!_~~~ As the discrepancy in opinion beb1een the 
devi ant member and the group increases , conformity pressures are 
stepped up (Festinger, 1968, 185 ). r,n initi al increase in colT1nuni" 
cation t o t he deviant is the prime vehicle for conformity pressures. 
Although the initial res ponse to deviance may be incl'eased comrnuni-
C.:ltion d'irt1ctf!d tm,tards the deviant, continued deviance may result 
in reduced crnnmunication and/or psychological rejection from or 
i solation within the gr0up (Schachter , 166 ). The amount and 
inten!d ty of the corr.muni cated conformity press m~es increase as the 
di scrzpuncy bebtcen gtoup and deviant vlidens (Co11ins and GuetzkoH, 
179-180). 
( 3) Q~.fE!Jl}j.!l £!:!:.SS ~~- .~.!.!£~~~~ .~~ .~.~~~. ~.~!!~ .9i .. t ile de vi ant 
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increases. The higher the i ndividual's status, the greater will 
be the pressures for his conformity to group norms. The greater 
influence and centrality of highly ranked persons results in an 
increased amount of influence and communication flowing t~~ards 
them (Hopkins, 65-67}. 
The high status individual, ha~ever, may be more resistant 
to conformity pressures than the low status individual. High 
status individuals build up "idiosyncracy credits" on the basis 
of past behavior \~hich permit great deviance (Jacobson, 26 and 
31}. Leaders typically accrue mot·e "idiosyncracy credits" which 
allow deviance at less cost (Jacobson , 133}. 
Hhile leaders and other high status members are more resis-
tant to a given conformity press ure than 1 01·1 status members, the 
high status individua1 must fa.ce !!!2.!'!!.. confotiility pressures th an 
the low st&.tus indivi dua·l. For example, the l eader's representa~ 
ti ve functi on and his leyi timacy based on group nonns combine with 
hi s centt·al position in the comnunication network to assure 
greater conformity press u1·es than the non-leader (Verba~ 185- 189). 
Cohesive gr·oups deve 1 op press m·es tm'la rds conformity on a 
given issue. The group, in Effectt directs devi ants to move 
tm·tat·ds the policy of t he group. The particul ar policy tovtards 
vthi ch de vi ants Hill be di 1·ected is de te1·mi ned by the hi e1·a 1·chy of 
poHer within the group. 
The Di 1·ecti on of Conformi tv Press ure i s Determined !fr. ~li~. ~Trecffve Grc1 se o(PoweflTfff.i:i_n_ the ~ 
Pm~er i s defined in a behav·iora1 context. An agent has pO\•Ier 
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over a reci pi en t \'I hen the acts of the agent can modify the behavior 
of the recipient. Po~1e r may exist without being overtly exercised 
by the agent. P~'ier is simply the potential to modify another's 
behavior (Collins and Guetzkow, 121- 122; Raven and French, 400). 
Implicit in the concept of power is the power recipient's 
perception of his dependence on son~ resource possessed by the 
power agent. The agent has power because the recipient wants or 
needs sorrething the agent possesses. The dependence of the pO\'Ier 
t·eci pi ent upon the agent increases \>lith the recipient • s 11moti va-
tional investrnent 11 in t he goals mediated by t he agent. The more 
important the resource possessed by the agent to the recipient, 
the gt~eater the agent 1 s power. The dependence of the pm•1er 
recipi ent decreasr~s \'lith the ava·il abil ity of the resource to the 
reci pi ent outside of the agent-recipi ent relationship. In other 
words~ the ~gent•s povwr- is lessened if the recipient can obtain 
the desired resource elsevthere (Emerson, 32 and Jacobson, 2u3 and 
66~67). 
This concept of dependency of the ,~e cipient on the resources 
of the agent as the essence of power 1 eads to an ell)phas is on both 
the t"esources of the agent and the responses of the rnci p·ient. 
The exercise of pm•Jel~, then~ i s a process including both the pm<~er 
attempt by the agent and the po\'ter response by the red r>i ent. 
£_~ r an d __ £'..2.1~ 
Samuel Johnson said, among many other things, that "power 
is not suffic-ient evidence of t r uth." Hovlevet~ , it is suffici ent 
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evidence to convince many people of the truth. Individuals conform 
to the policy desired by the povterful not out of some higher knOI't-
ledge of truth, but by the force of powe.-. Surely, truth may be 
power, but povter as often begets beliefs \•thich we believe to be true. 
Hilsman defines politics as the exercise of povter on behalf of 
policies by groups of people. He sees the outcome of a policy debate 
as the result of power. In short, "policy making is a political 
process . " And the political process is largely a powe r process 
(Hilsman, 1971, 117 and 135). 
So defined, politics becomes not the narrow concern of those 
studying government ,. but the operation of powet' in any decision-
making context. Decisions are not made according to some fo rma 1 
rul e-book est ab li shing the laws and logic of decision-maki ng . 
Deci s ions made in groups involve people stt' iving for both conflict ing 
i ntet·es t s and mutua 1 consensus -~for \·that they \'.' ant cmd fo r what t he 
group want s. These i ndividual s possess di fferent a.moun ts of povter. 
The resolut i on of t heir rm·te r di f ferenti als det ermines t he di rect·ion 
of con formi ty for the group. The group vti ll exe t·ci se conformi ty 
press ures on dev·iant s to move tO\·tards the po li cy option of the 
mos t pm•tetful membet"s (Jacobson , 95 and 11 4). 
Povter l~es out'ces 
The di fferent types of po',oter refl ect t he var·i ous resou rces 
avail ab l e to t he povHH' agent . The concept of power may be divi ded 
int o fi ve br oad t ypes. Fir·st , rewat·d po\'ter i s based on the 
reci pi ent ' s per ception that t he agent has t he abili ty to re~'lard 
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him. The recipient is dependent on the agent for the provision 
of positive valences. Second, coercive po\'ter is based on the 
recipient's perception that the agent has the ability to punish 
him. The recipient is dependent on the agent for the avoidance 
of negative valences. Third, legiti mate pm<~er is based on the 
recipient's pel·ception that the agent has a legitimate right to 
influence hi m by virtue of the agent's position. The recipient 
is dependent upon the agent due to the r ecipient 1 s 0\'m inter-
nali zed acceptu.nce of the "oughtness" of the agent's povte r position. 
Fourth, referent pm1er i s bas ed on the recipient' s identification 
\·tith the agent. The re cipi ent is dependent upon the agent due to 
the recipient' s identification with the agent's person. Fifth, 
expert pm•te r i s based on t he recipient' s pet·ception that the agent 
possesses speci a l kno\'tl edge , s kills, or abiliti es . The recipi ent 
is dependent on the agent fo r t hese res ources (French and Raven, 
262- 263). 
~tet· Rcseo_~ 
The power att empt i s only part of the power pr ocess . The 
response of t he reci pi ent i s equally ·j mportant. The powe r r eci pi ent 
has a var ·i ety of responses avai 1 abl e t o hi m. The power reci pi ent 
can respon d r os "itive1y , neutr ally, or negat ivel y to t he po~t1e r 
at tempt . Further-. the povter recipi ent ' s response t akes pl ace i n 
four areas or f i el ds : overt behavior ~ p1Aivate be l iefs, ·i nt er (}cti on 
\'lith t he agent ~ and eval uati on of t he agent (Raven and Krugl ansk·i, 
77-78). For examp l e , the r eci pi ent can respond pos itively t o t he 
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power attempt by changing his overt behavior, while responding 
negatively by changing his private beliefs in the opposite direction 
sought by the agent. Further negative responses could include the 
avoidance of interaction with the agent and increased differenti-
zati on beb1een recipient and agent. 
Kelman has classified the available responses of the recipient 
into three classes; namely, compliance, identification, and inter-
nalization. Compliance is motivated by the desire for rewards 
or the fear of puni shments. Compliance t akes the form of overt 
behavior or (occasionally) private beliefs. A high degree of 
surveillance is necessary to assure compliance. Identi f ication 
is motivated by the desire to maintai n a satisfying relationship 
\'li th the agent. Identification requires the continuation of the 
t'elationsh·ip. Identification tal~es the form of positive evaluation 
of the agent and satisfying ·interacti on \'li th the agent. Identifi-
cation can be expected to at l east lead to compliance in overt 
behavior. Internalization i s motivated by the content of the 
induced behavior. Internalization requires neither surveillance 
or a continuing ~~el utionship. Internali zation t akes the form of 
increased positive behavior and positive pr·ivate belief change 
(Kel man, 1958, 51-60) . 
Having established the available power resources and responses, 
Ne can nov/ combine the t\'10 in a detailed ex ami nation of the types 
of power. 
Reward P O':Je l' 
A man of powel~, Benj a.min Disraeli, once observed that "real 
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politics are the possession and distribution of power." It is 
likely, given the state of English politics at the time, that 
Disracli was referring to the possession and distribution of 
re\'tards. Of course, political patronage is the classic example 
of rel·tard povter in operation. 
The strength of reward po\'ter will increase with the va 1 ue 
to the recipient of the re\'tard controlled by the agent. Reward 
p~ter can consist of either the administering of positive valences 
or the removal of negative val ences (French and Raven, 263). 
Re\'lard power , as defined here, refers to task-envi ronmenta 1 rewards. 
Re\'tards derived from interpersonal relationships can be classifi ed 
under the heading of referent pQI.·Jer. A substantia 1 body of reseanh 
data sho'll that the control of t ask-environmenta l rei'lards is a source 
of po\·ter (Col lins il_nd Guetzko\'ls 120-123}. Horeover, it is not 
necessary for the agent to have direct contro 1 of re\'tards if he can 
affect or mediate the re\'lards provided by third parties (Collins and 
Guetzkovt, 140 }. 
The recipient's response to reward po\'ter will ordinat·ily be an 
increase in positive ovet~t behavior. There \'lill usually be an 
accompanying increase in positive interaction with the agent, though 
not necessarily an increase in identification . The resource 
diffe rences between recipi ent and agent ,,; J 1 operate to 1 imi t the 
extent to wh ich the reci pient ' s evaluation of the agent will be 
posit·i ve . Reward po\'Jer \'Ji 11 not necessarily lead tO\'nlrds positive 
change in private beli ef (Raven and Krugl anski, 79 and Kel man, 1958 5 
54-60}. In other words, patronage will not guarantee hmi a person 
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will vote in the privacy of the polling booth. 
Coercive PO'tfer 
11 Hinds are not conquered by arms , 11 \•lamed Spinoza. Of course, 
minds are not, but bodies arc. And coercive power exercises its 
particular influence on overt behavior. 
The s t rength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of 
the negative val ence of the expect ed puni shment (French and Raven, 
263). Coercive power, like reward power , will exist only to t he 
degree t hat condi ti ons for punis hment are cl ear and that compli ance 
can be observed by the agent (Collins and Guetzko\'1 , 133 and Ke l man, 
1958 , 55-60). 
The recipi ent ' s response to coet•ci ve powe r ~li 11 ordinarily 
be t ovtards pos i tive change in over t behaviot· and negative ch ange 
in eval uati on of the agent. Similarly , \'/e can expect either no 
change m· negati ve change in private bel iefs and in interact ion 
wi th the agent (Raven and Krugl anski, 80 }. Research studi es 
indi cate t hat t he exerci se of coerci ve power reduced i nterpers anal 
attraction and thus li mi ts the exerci se of referent pm•1er in the 
futw~e (Co 11 ins and Guet?.kow $ 135 }. The punishment by t he agent 
will reduce the recipient ' s i denti fication with the agent' s person 
and . thus, reduce referent pm'ler . Coercive povte t" is disti ngui shed 
from re\'Jard pm·ter by t he decreased i nterpersona 1 attraction, 
decreased or negat i ve i nte t·acti on between agent and recipi ent, and 
i ncreased surveillan ce needs (Raven and Krugl anski , 77 and Ke l man, 
1958, 51-60) . 
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legitimate Power 
Blackstone provides us with a fine example of the legitimate 
power of position: "That the King can do no wrong is a necessa~ 
and fundamental principle of the English constitution." The 
legitimate power of the King's position is based upon his subjects• 
perception of the King's divine right to rule. legitimate pm'ler 
is the povter of position, be it the royal thrones the judicial 
bench, or the White House. 
The strength of legitimate power depends upon the degree 
of 11 rightness 11 the r ecipient attributes to the agent's pov1er. 
The recipient must see the agent 1 s position as a 11 ri ght11 source 
of pm·ter in the particular case ( Raven and Kruglanski, 74). Role 
pres cripti on~ and expectations indicate the behavi ors i n \·lhich 
an individual must engage or behaviors in whi ch he must not engage 
by virtue of his position (Fren ch and Raven, 264). 
In t he case of legitimate povter, the evidence indicates that 
fo rmal des i gnation as a leader, supe1·visor , boss , etcet era, \!till 
be by i tself a source of power. Such des i gnation is, however, only 
one source of power v;hich can be s upplemented or detracted by other 
pm·Jer sourc:es (Coll ins and Guetzkm1, 148- 150). Leadershi p po\':er 
can inc·lude the r e'(Jards and pun·ishments opportuniti es officially or 
tradi t i onarty ass oci a ted \'lith the l eader •s_posit·ion ( Fiedler' , 369-
370) . In short , the l eader' s l egitimate pm·1er may be supplemented 
by reward or punishment pov1er avai l ab l e to him due to the l egi t i mat e 
roi e he fi ll s (Jacobs on, 24-25). 
The recipient ' s response to l egi t i mate povle t· will ordinarily 
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involve positive change in both overt behavior and private beliefs. 
The recipient \'li 11 decrease i denti fi cation \·lith the agent, s i nee 
the possession of 1 egi timate power increases dissimi 1 arities. To 
the extent that the recipient \'tishes to avoid the legitimate request 
to do something he \'IOuld prefer not to do, interaction . \·tith the . 
agent may decrease (Raven and Kruglanski, 75 and 80). Legitimate 
power does not require surveillance since the recipient's motivation 
is his own internalized values. Legitimate povter does require the 
continuation of the recipient·agent relationship (Kelman, 1958, 54· 
60). 
Referent Po\'ter 
People are generally better persuaded by the 
l~easons 1•1hi ch they have themse'lves discovered 
than by those which have come into the min ds 
of others . 
-Pascal 
Actually, petsuasion is not really so demanding. · But 
persuasive success is more li kely v1hen l't'e can identify out~selves 
and our thoughts with the character and attitudes of the other. 
He can be persuaded by the thoughts \It hi ch come into the minds of 
others as long as their entry into our minds is not alien_ 
Referent power is ~i mply the process of interpersonal identi -
fication and attr·action. The strength of t•eferent power is 
dependent upon the degree of inte t~pe l~sona 1 ·attraction betv1een 
recipient and agent (Fren ch and Raven, 266). Research data shov1 
that increas ed intet'personal attraction of other group members 
for a single member ·increases the pOI'Ier of that individual (Colli ns 
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and Guetzkow, 128 and Jacobson, 28 and 121}. 
The recipient response to referent pm'ler will ordinarily 
involve positive change in overt behavior, private belief, 
interaction with the agent, and identification with the agent. 
Referent power, successfully used, increases i denti fi cation by 
further increasing the recipient's perception of similarity. 
Thus, referent pm'ier, based on identification, increases its 
cl'lln basis when successfully used. t~oreover, the perception of 
similarity \'lill lead to increased pos itive interaction between 
recipi ent and agent {Raven and Kruglanski, 81). 
Expert P01~ 
Hhen the experts are agreed the opposite 
opinion cannot be hel d to be cert ain ; when t he 
experts are not agreed , then no opinion can be 
held to be certain. 
-Bert rand Russell 
Russe 11 perha~s overs t at es t he po\lter of experts because he 
speaks of matte rs of truth and not matters of pm<te r. The exper t' s 
po\'/er increases \•ti th t he ext ent of his knowl edge, skills or 
abili t i es and with the dependence of the reci pient on these 
1Aes ources {F1·ench and Raven, 267). A reputation of competence , 
rega1·dl ess of whether t he group has obse\' ved the compe t ence, \'Ji 11 
serve as a source of power {Collins and Gue t zkow, 145-147). 
Control over in fonnat i on i s al so a source of pm·1er . The possessi on 
of te 1 evant i nforma ti on , even by a s1:1a 11 minority of the group is 
a major sour ce of pm•Je r (Shm'l and Penrod s 19 and Kass at' j ian and 
Kassarj ian, 49 1). 
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The recipient's response to expert power will ordinarily 
involve positive change in overt behavior and in private beliefs. 
As in the case of legitimate power, the use of expert power 
emphasizes the differences between recipient and agent, resulting 
in negative i denti fi cation. Expert povrer may further 1 ead to 
avoidance of interaction with the agent if the reci pi ent would 
prefer not to be influenced (Raven and Kruglanski, 80 ). 
Successful use of expert pm'ler, hov~e ver, requires neither sur .. 
veill ance nor an ongoing rel ationship (Ke lman , 1958, 54-60). 
The link betvreen the pm'le r agent and the p0\'1er reci pi ent 
in the process cf po\'/er exercise is comn unication. Conmuni cat ion 
is the vehicle or mechanism used to actuali ze or ooerationali ze 
pm<~er (Schachter , 166 and Jacobson, 42 and 80 ). Hhether we 
com,11un i cate ou r poHer to the othe r is deter111i ned by our percep-
ti on of the opportunity. This percepti on is fo rmed i n and 
confi nnc.! d by the group. An unders t andi ng of t he determinants of 
the communi cation of power i s sought in the third proposition . 
Th e percept i on of the worl d is an act i ve process compri sed 
of fi l tering , arranging, and di storting i ncomi ng experience i n 
order to mai ntain consistency 1·1ith past expe r'i ence nnd bel i efs . 
In l arge part, \'-le create t he 1'/0 l~l d 1>1e percei ve (Frank, 97-11 3). 
The perceptual cons t ruction of real ity depends on ti'IO 
proce~s e<> : a fi lter i nu process that determines \'I hat i s selected 
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as stimuli and an interpretative process that determines vthat 
meaning the stimuli has for us {de Riveria, 39). 
In the Book of Common Prayer, vte find a prayer to God 
asking for help for those vtho cannot see the lord--"eyes have 
they, and see not. 11 As some do not see the lord, some frequently 
avoid more empirical stimuli everyday. He control the stimuli 
vthi ch confront us by avoidance of situations or sources \'lhi ch might 
provide unwelcome stimuli. In short, we actively build an environ-
ment of friends, books, ide as, et cetera, \'I hi ch pro vi de us vii th 
\'telcome stimuli and protects us from unvtelcome ones (de Riveria, 
40-41). We can further control the stimuli which conf ront us by 
creating \'te lcomed stimuli. The self-fulfilling prophecy involves 
actions based on our perception which actually produce stimuli 
confinning the odginal perception. The self-fulfilling prophecy 
is made possib le by t he inte ractive nature of human behavior (Frank, 
145 and de Riveria, 40 ). 
The second process of per·cepti on i s the i nte rpretat·i ve stage. 
t·1onse11 pl eads to the non .. beli evers to 11 0nly believe, and thou 
shalt see 11 Christ. Often we inte rpret stimuli on the bas is of an 
almost religious faith . When an event does occur and we do perceive 
it, the stimuli may sti ll be l egiti mately in terpreted in several 
different vwys. ~le tend t o £ri ve t he meaning to a stimuli which 
requi res the l enst psychological change in our be"liefs ( de Riveri a , 
22). In short, the human perceptual process enables us to deny 
or di s tort data in order to conf·inn our images cm d beli efs ( Deutsch 
a.nd 11erritt, 182-183 ). 
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For a non-religious example, we can turn to the field of 
international relations. Individuals form images of nations 
considered to be enemies. Once the image is formed and expacta-
tions regarding 11 their11 actions are shaped, information is 
selected and interpreted to confirm the image (Frank, 116-117 
and Scott, 80). A specific example involves the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor. According to one theory, intelligence informa-
tion indicating the forecoming attacks \·tas not seen as relevant. 
The infot111ation conflicting vtith accepted beliefs was interpreted 
in different \'lays to conform with our image of the Japanese as 
too weak and timid for attack . This example clearly demonstrates 
the degr·ee to which 11 \'/e construct the reality in \·thi ch \'te operate" 
(de Ri veri a , 20-21 an d Wohlstetter, 691-767) . 
Natura 'l1y , v1c ftequently adapt our beli efs to new dat a. Our 
resi stances ar-e s o strong, however , that they can be ove rcome only 
i f nonH of the cons istent interpretati ons can be eas "ily accounted 
for. Fo r example, 1·,re might find that act i ons based on one inte l~­
pretat i on do not V101·k. In the face of failure , \'le may be f otced to 
alte r our interpretat i on (de Ri veri a, 35-36) . 
Rol e of Stress 
The normal sel ectivi ty of our perceptual process i s aggravated 
dur ing stressful or cri sis situat i ons. Durin g t i mes of stress He 
arc l ess open t o sti tnuli, consi der fevte r intel·pret ati ons , and are 
more r ig i d and repet i t ive in our interpretations (Prui t t, 395-396 
and Robinson and Snyder, 457) . The f ur t her di st ortion of the 
perceptuc: l process may be t i ed to the need fo r structu re and the fear 
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of ambiguity in the crisis situation (de Riveria, 150). Research 
indicates that groups in stressful situations make early attempts 
to recognize structure i n ambiguous situations. r1oreover, these 
groups rigidly adhere to initial interpretations despite increasingly 
conflicting stimuli {Korten, 355). 
So far, it may sound as though the individual perceives in a 
vacuum. Actually, individual knov1ledge is either the result of 
personal experience, of observation of another 's experience, or of 
hearing a report about another's experience {Collins and Guetzkovt, 
38). In any case, individuals tend to seek stability in their 
beliefs and perceptions through associ ation in groups {de Riveri a , 
27). 
r-es t i nger hilS postul ated t hat 1·1e are mo tivated by a dt•i ve to 
evaluate our opi ni ons which, in the absence of objective or physical 
data , can only be satisfied through compari son with ot hers (Radloff , 
110 and Festinger , 1954 , 117- 119). The group , then, serves as the 
validator of our soci al pe rceptions. Groups al so fonn our percep-
tions by cont rolling t he stinuli v:e receive fr om them and encouragi ng 
li mHed interpretat i ons of sti muli. He fin d that the confi nnation 
of perceptual \'lorlds among group mnmbers i s sel f- rein forcing since 
each member i s checking his vi ews against t hose of others \·tho sh are 
simil ar views (Frank ~ 99-100). 
In short, \•/e precei ve the \1/ay events 1·el at e to the povter \'te 
possess . Avail able data indicates t hat in the case of Pearl Harbor, 
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no major decision-maker perceived of the possibility of attack. 
Those lesser officials filtered the stimuli available to the major 
decision-makers, thus precluding the decision-makers from realizing 
an opportunity to exercise power. The lesser officials interpreted 
the stimuli they received in a manner conforming to officials' 
expectations. In so interpreting the information, the lesser 
offici a 1 s did not rea 1 i ze an opportunity to exercise expert pm·ter 
by making the information and their interpretations known to major 
decision-makers. The example of Peat·l Harbor is perhaps typical 
of governmental operation. Leaders ordinarily receive both infor~ 
mation and interpretations through channels and organizations. 
The opportunity to exercise power on the basis of certain information 
or on behalf of certain options is not realized due to the nature 
of out• perceptua·l process (see Halperin , 197 '1, 88-89 and Verba , 1961a, 
112). 
!he AeEropri ateness of the Exercise of Pov,rer is 
Detenm ned bflJie P_erceetua o , tl]eGr'Ou~ 
Appropriateness is the quality of being allov1able or fitting 
to the occasion . Power \'lhich is not deemed appropriate is not 
likely to be effective. The perceptual images of the group refer·s 
to the almost v·isual set of expectations the group holds regarding 
ro lcs and interacti ve behavior. These 9ro~:~p expectations are, in 
turn, effected by the task/interpersonal orientation of the group. 
Expectations _9.bout interactive behavi_Q!:. are limi tations on 
acceptable types of behavior. A member may not be rude or, in some 
groups , qui et \'li t hout viol ati ng the group's image of ho\'J inter action 
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will occut' (de Ri veri a, 70). Be me theorizes that groups soon 
fonn a collective image of ho\'1 the group members should interact. 
These patterns of acceptable interaction form the group etiquette 
and character (Berne, 92 and 110), The group etiquette serves to 
limit members in the exercise of pm1er. For example, a group 
whose etiquette called for cooperative interaction among members 
would deem the obvious use of coercive power inappropriate. The 
same group may heavily rely upon and even sanction the appropriate-
ness of referent pov1er. 
Role expectati.ons and i ma~es form an organizational structure 
\'lhich supports the group etiquette by prescribing appropriate 
behavior for each person. The individual's role indicates the v1ay 
in which he is supposed to act consistent with group expectations 
(Berne , 38). The individual's rol e operates to direct the 
i ndi vi dua 1 tah'ards certain behaviors as appropri ate and a•day from 
behavi ors inappropriate to the group's organization al structu~e 
(Raven and French, 400). 
The group's perception of member roles limits membe rs to 
the exercis e of pov1er only \'/hen it is consi s tent v1ith the rol e. 
For example, the role definition of an expert mi ght make the 
exe1·ch:e of expert pm'le r natura 1 and appropr·i ate. The same expert 
might be limited by hi s rol e from exet~cising referent powe r as 
well. Of course~ roles al so encourage a pm·wr reci pi ent to accept 
a po\'ler· attempt. The response to a l egiti mate power attempt is 
especially influenced by the individual's rol e. The fai lure to 
exercise p01·1er in conformity \'lith role expectations v1ill likely 
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result in effectual pO\•/er at best, and a reduction of future 
pm"ler at \-Jorst. 
The task/interpersonal orientation of the group further aids 
the determination of appropriateness of power exercise. Bales 
has postulated that every group faces opposing strains bet\•/een 
task- environmental and interpersonal (social -emotional) needs. 
The accomplishment of task needs requires specialization and 
differentialization of pov1er, while the satisfaction of inter-
personal needs requires simi'larity and power equality (Bales, 
127-131). rn other \·lords, the task need requires specialization 
among group members which increases the differences between 
them. The increased differences that result from speci a 1 i zati on 
reduce the satisfaction of interpe rsonal needs . Task needs 
further require po'11er· differences with some members possessing 
more po\·,te r than others . Tflese pov/el" diffel"ences reduce the 
sati sfaction of in terpersonal needs which requi re pOI'Ier consistency. 
Ev·idence for Bale's theory (Collins and Guetzk0\·1 , 214- 221 and 
Jacobson , 95-98) shov1s that task emphas i s by the group may produce 
greater productivity, but reduced i nte rpers ana 1 satisfaction. An 
interpersonal emphasis \'til'! le ad to greater satisfact i on, but may 
do so at t he expense of task success. An interpersonal orientation 
is characteri zed by cooperative, fl"iendly, non-status oriented 
behavi or. A task orientation i s charact eri zed by compet iti ve , 
agg1·ess ive , status oriented behavior. 
The t as k/interpetsonal orientation of the g1·oup \'Jill operate 
to rul e cert.ai n pm·ter attempts i naprropl"i ate. llani s offers evi dence 
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that interpersonal orientation in groups reduces critical thinking 
(Janis, 1972, 198-199). He might expect fe\'tet· po\'ter attempts in a 
group with the characteristics of interpersonal orientation. \·le 
might also expect the use of referent po\'ter to be the most appropriate 
in interpersonally oriented groups. He do kno\'t that interpersonal 
orientation results in a high degree of conformity due to the greater 
cohesiveness of such groups (Jacobson, 96-97) . 
A number of factors operate to determine a group 's orientation 
at a given decision-making point. Bales clearly sees task and 
interpersonal strains operating in constant tension. The failure 
to achieve balance between task and interpersonal orientations 
over a period of time will reduce cohesiveness by neglect of either 
task or interpersonal goals. In short, the factor of ti me \'till 
scn·ve in a cohes ive group as u force fot· change in orientations 
tovHH'ds ba l unce. 
FuY'thel' change in orientations may occur in res ponse to 
external events. For example , negative evaluat·ion f1·om external 
sounes of the group \'lil1 ·lead to an interperson al orientat ion 
(Jacobson, 144). Further » there is some evidence to suggest t hat 
groups are more inclined tOI'Iards a t ask emphas·is in ti mes of crisis 
(Kot·t cn , 356). These exter·nal pressures may aid in a determination 
of a partict1lar group's emphasis ·during a particula.Y' decisional 
situation . 
The In dividual Percept·ion of Des·irab ili ty of Po\·Jer Exeni se 
rs--D(~telnmi necf !~X his J1erce6l 1 on anCT'7\ssessment of tl~rtun i ty_ 
Indivi dual evaluati on of t he des i r ab i ·1 ity of t he oppor tunity 
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includes the follm'ling considerations: the importance of the issue; 
the net advantage to be gained; and the possible effectiveness of 
the power attempt. 
The agent will find the exercise of povter more desirable as the 
importance of the issue increases (Festinger, 1968, 185). The 
recipient will find the positive response to a pQ\Iter attempt less 
desirab le as the importance of the issue increases. The importance 
of the situation is a significant determinant of the choice to 
exercise pm'ler (Lippitt, et al., 243-244). 
Nei the\" the power agent nor the pOI'Ier recipient wi 11 engage 
in a successful power attempt without perceiving an advantage to 
their actions. l·le may, for ex amp 1 e, act in accordance \·Ji th our 
role expectations in order to continue to conform to group expecta-
tions and perhaps recP.ive group rewards (Car-twri ght and Zander, 
219). Or 'l'le may act in a manner designed to preserve our power 
for future opportunities (Hil sman, 1959 , 365). 
The desirability of initiating pm'ler attempts is, in part , 
related to individual percepti on of the probability of success. 
We are more likely to initiate a pmter attempt if we perceive that 
v1e \'/ill be successful (Festinger, 1968, 186 ) . Self-perception of 
p01·1er is highly correlated \'Jith perception of pm<~er by others and 
in attempted influence (Lippitt, ·et al. , 240-243). Accordingly, 
\'Je might expect the recipi ent's perception of his po\'Jer and the 
agent's pov1er to determi nc the degree of resistance to a power 
attempt. Stud·ies do show that the more confident a deviate, the 
greatCl' Hi 11 be his resistan ce to po\'Jer attempts (Hochhaum, 683-687 ). 
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Certainly, we can expect the recipient to evaluate the strength 
and probability of success of any given pm•ter attempt. 
In surrrnary, cohesive groups develop pressures to\ltards conformity 
on a given issue . The direction of the confonnity pressures will be 
determined by the effective utilization of pm'ler Hithin the group. 
The utilization of poHer is limited or allowed by the perceptions and 
expectations of the group. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BAY OF PIGS 
The ill-fated invasion of Cuba in April, 1961 
was one of those rare politico-military events--
a perfect failure. 
-Theodore Draper 
Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an 
orphan. 
..John F. Kennedy 
Perfect failures seem to be dest·jned to be orphaned. Certainly 
in the case of the Gay of Pigs no one vJas willing to claim parent-
hood. John Kennedy stepped forward to accept full responsibility 
much like the young man \'lho marries h·is pregnant girlfriend while 
procl aim·ing his virtue and virginity to his parents. The Bay of 
Pigs \·Jas mote bastard than orphan. And l·i ke many bastards, the 
"father11 is diff·icult to de term·ine. 
Shortly uftCl" his el ection~ Pres ident-elect Kennedy was 
bri efed on the preparations for· the Bny of Pigs operation init) ated 
under the previous administration. At the time, he gave hi s 
appt·ova.1 for continuing pl'epal~ation v1ithout a.ctual1y r.ommitting 
himself to eventual c:pproval of thH invasion attemp t (Schlesinger, 
233). 
CIA Dir ector All en Dulles nnd hi s assistant Richard Bissell 
faced a "di ff'icu1t dH11lenge 11 in persu C.~ding a nei'Js- mo~·e "liberal" 
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Pt~esident to support the invasion plan. Imnediately, these two 
men, certain that they knew best for the nation, began selling 
the ne\'1 President the operation by telling him whatever they 
thought would persuade (Gelb and Halperin, 28-30). T\'IO days 
after the inallguration, Dulles and General Lemnitzer, Chainnan 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, br·iefed the leading members of the 
nevt administration. Followi ng the briefing, Kennedy ordered the 
Joint Chiefs to make a complete study of the plan•s military 
feasibility and allm·1ed the CIA to proceed with the preparations 
it was making (Schl esinger, 238}. 
Theodo1'e Sorensen reports that after the invasion failure 
the p,~esi dent told tri m of his own deep skepticism from the 
beginning (Sorensen , 1965, 295). Schlesinger also reports an 
c<n·lier co:wersation Nith Kennedy which indicated the President's 
douhts about thc-! invas·i on's ability t o "touch off a mas s insur-
rection agai nst the regime". 'fhe Hhite House , the Jo·in t Chiefs 
of Staf f$ end supposedly the C!l\ all considered the t r i g9ering of 
an uprising within Cuba to be crucial to the invasion's success 
(Schles inger, 2116-247}. 
Das pi tc ea1· ly skepticism, John Kennedy, a 11 the seni ot' 
advisors \'li t hin t hP. iidministration. t he Joint Chi efs of Staff, 
and!' of course, t he CIJl.~-a 1'1 supported the p 1 an. Th roughout the 
per iod dur ing v' ich t he p1an was under· serious consideration 
there Has vi ttua11y 110 oppos·it'i on \·Jith'irt the ttdm'irdstt'uti on (Halton, 
43). The meetings, Schle!>i nger reportsp took 11 place i n a curious 
iltmosphe t'e of assumed consens us ." The key dcci s i on-nt:\ke1·s met four 
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times after 1·1arch 15 to consider the plan. The Joint Chiefs 
approved of the operation's military feasibility. Robert 
MacNamara, seemingly preoccupied in his ne1-1 position, accepted 
the verdict of the Chiefs regarding the plan's military feasi-
bility and the verdict of the CIA regarding the likelihood of 
an uprising. Dean Rusk listened "inscrutably .. , making only a 
few "gent1e 11 noises about possi h le excesses {Schlesinger, 250). 
Ct··iticism d·id carne ft·om lesse1· offic-ial s \'lithin t he admin-
·istration. Schl esi nger provided a \'H~i tten criti ci sm fot· Kennedy, 
but did not speak out duri ng the 1·1at·ch or April meetings~ Under~ 
secretary of State Chestel' Bo·;(ies" learning of the pl an wh·ile 
fill i ng in for r.usk who v1as at ct SEATO meeting, was hon~if·ied at 
the grotlp1 s co;rapi a cent acceptance of Hhat he saw as a badly 
flnwed pl ~.n . Hi s oppositi on1 us v;e shnl"l see~ never reached the 
Pres i dent ( Sch l e~; inger ~ 2SO )e Fl-om out si de the c1C~ministl~ationv 
a t h·i r d voice of di s sent crws raised by S<·!nator Hilli am Fu1br-i qht: . 
At the f inal meeting of the deci sion-maki ng group on April 4i 
Fulbl'ight guv~ u strong o:1ci irq)assi oned speech ogainst t he invas i on 
plan ~ Foll ett·li r: g tl1is s t t'mtg speech by an out5 i de r, t'lacNiJJ,w t·a an d 
the othm- seni or advisors prc..:ee(~E: d t o indi cat e thcit· support fo r 
tha in vrts i on~ Y..en1wdy di ci not call on sc:r.les inge ;· t o voi ce his 
cr·iti cis:tlS. s and Schles inge l' di d not choo~e to vol unteer t!H~m. 
Thus~ th;! de1ibeti':tions ended \'/it!1 on 1y onE: vo·i ce of di ssent 
hcnd ng ever been r a·i sed w i t irin the group of deci s i o;1- :nakers 
Thf~ SHcc.::ssfu·l ope;"a.t ion of st ron9 r~·es s ures fot~ conformity i s 
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evident. Schlesinger limited his public opposition partly due 
to a feeling of futility (Schlesinger, 255}. John Kennedy may 
have contributed to such feelings by saying several d~s before 
the Apri 1 4 meeting that 11 \'/e seem now des tined to go ahead on a 
quasi-minimum basis 11 (Schlesinger, 256}. A few days l ater at 
the home of Robert Kennedy, Sch 1 es i nger was dravm aside by the 
Attorney General and asked about his opposition to the plan. 
Robert Kennedy responded to Schlesinger's criticisms by saying, 
"you may be right or you may be \'/rang, but the President has 
made his mind up. Don't push it any further. Novt is the time 
for everyone to help him all they can11 (Janis, 1972, 41-42). 
Robert Kennedy's pressuring on hehalf of the President took pl ace 
several days before the April 4 meeting at which Schlesinger 
remained so sil ent. 
The case of Chester Bov.tles is an equally clear exan1ple of 
the operation of conformity pressm·es . Dowles prepa1ned a memo 
listi ng the reasons for his opposition to the invasion. Upon 
Rusk's retm·n, BO\'>'les asked his supet-ior to fon•lard the memo to 
the Pr·es ident or to let Bov1lcs himse1f present it to the group. 
Rusk r·efused to do so . saying that the ·invasion 1<1ou ld be pared 
do1-m to a quiet little infiltr'at i on an_y\'lay. Hhen Bm·lles' opposition 
became public knm:ledge fo 11 o;·ring the invasion ' s failut·e 5 he paid 
dearly 1·Ji th hi s job and his 1·eputc:ti on among the Kennedys (Hil sman, 
1967, 36-37 and J an is, 1972, 42 ). 
Thus, the only direct, open, and comp1ete dis a9reement \<lith 
the invasion came from Serwtor Fulbl"ight on the final day of th e 
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group's deliberations. Obviously, the last minute opposition 
by a lone outsider did little to oub'leigh the "united ~oice of 
institutional authority" and the support of all the senior 
advisors {Schlesinger, 258- 259 and Janis, 1972, 44). 
Of course John Kennedy approved the invasion. On Apri 1 17 
it began. and it soon became obvious that it was destined to be 
a "perfect failure". The question nm'i becomes one of explanation. 
How did the group come to such uniform agreement on such an 
amazing fiasco? As \'las earlier theorized, confol,nity pressures 
develop around poli cy options supported by the greatest sources 
of effectively exercised power within the group. 
The Effective Exetci se of Po\'-ter 
------ .. 
Ho\'1 caul d I ha.ve been so fm~ off base? Hmt 
could I hctve been so stupid, to l et then, go 
ahead? 
- John Kennedy 
Kennedy's "stupidity" and the "stupidity" of hi s major 
advisors \'l as in theil· responses to the power attempts by Dulles 
and Bisse11. These expert bureaucrats {see pol'te r agents ) 
effectively limited the pm'ler of the President and his senior 
advisors by a number CJf time~honored techniques {Gelb and Halpel'·in, 
28-36). 
Horton Hal perin writes that bureaucraci cs exercise their 
pOI'Ier through fout· areas of po 1 icy-making : information, presenta-
tion of options, freedom to choose options , and imp"l ementation . 
The contto1 of information is a major source of pO\•ter f01~ agencies 
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to protect their interests by influencing policy. The selection 
of information is different from what the President would like 
to have and from what he thinks he is getting. 
The presentation of options limits the framework in which 
the President may choose. He chooses between policy option X 
and Y, but the agency presenting the options chooses the content 
of X and Y and \'lhy there is no Z. 
Shou 1 d options contrary to the interests of an agency become 
lo 
availabl e, the agency will act ;M" limit the President's freedom 
to choose that option . The President's options can be limited 
through threatened l eaks to the press or claims of i nfeasi bil i ty 
based on special knowledge. 
Final ly, losing all else, the agency can i mplement an umoJanted 
Presidenti al decis·ion in a manner inconsistent \'lith its intent. It 
is an easy matter· to obey the l etter rathel~ than the spirit of a 
- - ---- - --- - -
Prf~s·i dentia1 directive. Easier· still is the delaying tactic at 
\'I hi ch bureaucrats become adept (Hal ped n. 1971 , 88·89 ) . 
The exercise of power by Dulles and Bissell on behalf of the 
CI A i s a cl assic example of the techniques outl·ined by Halperin. 
The underlying force behind the s uccess of these techniques is 
si mple power. With these t actical methods in mind, I nmt turn to 
a consideration of the exercise of pm-1er by those invol ved in the 
Bay of Pi gs deci sion. 
There i s littl e di1·ect evidence of the exercise of reward pa.'ler· 
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by the participants in the Bay of Pigs decision. In the absence 
of direct evidence and examples, I can only point to the existence 
of the potential and the opportunity for the use of reward power. 
Clearly, the Kennedy brothers and Dean Rusk possessed potentia 1 
reward power over their respective subordinates, Schlesinger and 
Bowles. I think it reasonable to suspect that during the early 
months of the administration, subordinates v1ould be especially 
eager to gain the favor and rewards of their superiors. Compliance 
to the group norm 1·1as directly l~eques ted by Robert Kennedy of 
Schlesinger and by Dean Rusk of Bowles. One can ass t.mle that 
Schlesinger and Bowl es foresa\'1 a reward to be gained th rough 
compliance. 
Coercive Pa,.,rer 
~lheneve1'" a Presi dent rej ects the advice of a rnajot~ advi so1· 
\'l'ho has staked hi s reputation and prestige on his advice !> a 
dangerous enemy may res ult (de Rived a, 235 and Sorensen 9 1963 , 
00). Dulles and Bi ssell exerci sed the tht"eat of coerci ve pm'le r 
in order to limi t the Pres ident' s ability t o choose t he opti on of 
cancell ati on . Having heavily committ ed t hei r pres ti ge to the 
pl an, its cancell ati on \•Joul d have made 11dangerous enemi es 11 of them 
both {Gelb and Hal perin, 30). 
i'li t hout having to t hreaten the 11 leaking11 of ·infonnati on by 
t hernse lves , Dulles and Bissell 1·1ere nb 1e to argue t hat the 
cancell ati on of t he pl an l'lou1d become public knCJw l edgc through 
the disbanding of t he refugee traini ng program. Dull es frequent ly 
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stressed the problem of disposing the trained refugees. At the 
Harch 11 meeting he pressed, "Don•t forget that we have a disposal 
problem. If \'Je have to take these men out of Guatemala, v1e will 
have to transfer them to the United States, and we can•t have them 
wandering around the country te 11 ing everyone \·that they have been 
doing•: (Schlesinger, 242). The reason 11 \-Je can•t have them telling 
••• vthat they have been doing" is that it would be politically 
embarrassing to administration 'ilho campaigned on the do-nothing 
policy of the Eisenhm-Jer administration tov1ards Cuba (Walton, 35-
41). As So1·ensen puts it, the P1·esident would be accused of 
calling off a plan to overthrow Castro. After all, all that was 
being asked v1as for the United States to "allm·/11 the refugees to 
11 1·eturn home 11 (Sorensen, 1965, 306). In short, had the President 
called off the invasion, he would have suffered considerable 
po"litical embarrassrn7.nt to say the least (Janis , 1972t 31). 
Referent Po\-Jer 
Dulles and Bissell backed up the implicit threat of political 
embarra5sment shou1d the President cancel the plan \-Jith a sizable 
dose of 1·eferent r.ov1e r as \vell. The third party nature of the 
leak by ft·ustl·ated refugees, 1·ather than by the t\-10 adm·ini strators 
themselvesp enabled Dulles and Bissell to take advantage of the 
Presi dent ' s political predi cament without seeming to actually 
threv.ten hi m \·lith pol itical harm. As a result, the substantial 
good will directed tm·wrds Dulles and Bissell could continue to 
operate as an effective source of referent power. 
Dulles and [3issell \'.'e i--e admired for thei r intelligence and 
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ability. Bissell especially seemed capable in inspiring great a\'te 
in at least some members of the policy group (Schlesinger, 241). 
Kennedy \'las s uffi ci ent ly impressed with Bi sse 11--he probably 
intended to appoint him to be Dulles' successor as Director of the 
CIA (Hilsman, 1967, 30). In short, they were seen as "highly 
prized members" of the team (Janis, 1972, 47). 
Irving Janis' interpretation of the invasion decision process 
places heavy stress on the interpersonal attraction bet\'1een the 
new admini s tration and Dulles and Bissell (Janis, 1972, 46-47). 
Much of what Janis sees as interpersonal attraction or identifica-
tion seems to be to be an admiration and respect for the abilities 
of those pe t~sons. The difference is important, since referent 
povter is based upon i dentification vJith a person. · Respect for the 
skills and abiliti es of a person is expert power. The ease with 
\·lhich John Kennedy d!llnped both Dulles and Bi ssell foll ovling the 
pl an' s fail ure and the degree t o \'lhich he bl amed "experts .. for 
deceiving him (see Sorensenp 1965 . 302M303) sugges t that the 
l~e fe t-ent pm'ier of Du'lles and Bi ssel 1 was more 1 imi ted t han Janis 
beli eves . M01·e i mpm·tant ly » the great expe \"t pO\'Ie r exerci sed by 
Dulles and Bissell conf li cts with t he exerci se of great ref erent 
power, s ince expert power creates a dis t ance between peopl e that 
limi ts ident ificati on (Bales, 129-130 ). 
Refe t-ent pm·Jel" may have been exercised to some degree by 
Dull es and Bi ssell . Opponent Schl esi nger probably used an even 
smaller· amount of referent pm·Jer on John Kennedy. Kennedy saw 
Schlesinger as the White House historian and as hi s l ink t o the 
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Stevenson wing of the party, not as a close ft•iend or trusted 
advisor (Anderson, 256-257 and 275). As we shall see later, 
being 1 inked to Stevenson would almost automati ca 11y limit the 
amount of i nterpersona 1 attraction bet\'leen Kennedy and Schlesinger 
(see Halberstram, 21-24). In fact, Schlesinger's memoirs and 
history of Kennedy's administration is less worshipful and self-
serving than that of othe1" Kennedy insiders. 
Legitimate Power 
The exercise of legitimate po\'Jer by the CIA, John and Robert 
Kennedy, and Dean Rusk a 11 served to further the adoption of the 
invasion plan by a confonning group. The CIA attempted to utilize 
legitimate power in order to assure that they alone would be the 
exclusive providers of information. Dulles and Bissell somehow 
prevailed upon the President to keep i nte 11 i gence experts in the 
Defense and State Departments in the dark (Hil sman, 1967s 30). 
Thus, the CIA utilized l egitimate power to strengthen its expert 
pm'ler by assuring itself of exclusive contt~ol of infonnation. 
Dulles and Bissell further exercised legitimate power to 
contr·ol the pr·esentation of opt ions. Throughout the meetings the 
options \'lere stated~ defi ned , and dr.fended by Dulles and Bissell 
as if only they had t he 11 right11 to do so (Janis, 1972, 43). 
As mentioned eal"li er, John Kennedy's position as President 
and Robert Kennedy ' s position as hi s b\·other \~Jere sources of power. 
llohn Kennedy's pov,rer remained l at·gely as potential, but Robert's 
baggering of Sd1l es inger i s clearly an exerci se of power based on 
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his special relationship to the President. 
Finally, good old quiet, careful Dean Rusk used his position 
as Secretary of State to keep subordinate Chester BCMles from 
voicing his opposition and to keep intelligence director Roger 
Hilsman from investigating his doubts (Hilsman, 1967, 31). BO\'Iles 
and Hilsman both responded to the legitimate power of Rusk. 
~er! Po!!~!: 
In the aftennath of the invasion's failure. the Kennedy 
insiders tended to blame the "experts" for the ·invasion's adoption. 
In a sense, \1/hile publicly accepting blame himsel f, John KEmnedy 
sm<~ the ·CIA as the rea 1 fathe r of defeat. It is true that the CIA 
used massive amounts of expert powel'o It is al so true that the 
members of the admini stration accepted those infl t~nces an d 
t-esponded to that pm<~er. 
Fit·st , Dulles a.nd Bissell excl"cised control over infonnat·ion-~ 
a form of expert power,. For example~ the likelihood of an updsing 
bei ng t riggey·od by the invasion force ' s l anding 1<1as solely 'l ef t 
up to the expert judgement of Dulles and Bissell. Despite the 
cruci a 1 natut'G of this judgement~ Dulles did not even cons u·t t the 
Deputy Director of the CIA for Intell ·ig(mce. In short, the 
Pres ident's only source of info rmation for the feasi bility of the 
invas ion was the CIA (Hil sman, 1967 ~ 31 and Walton, 46). 
The Jo·int Chiefs of Staff conditioned the·i r approval of the 
plan on the likelihood of an uprising inside the island. In 
approving the plan, the Chiefs made it clear that the ultimate 
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success of the plan required a s izable uprising. They reli ed 
upon the untested judgment of Dulles and Bissell t hat such an 
uprising would occur {Schlesinger, 238- 239 and Tully, 243). 
Secondly , Dulles and Bi sse 11 exercised expe1·t powe1· to 
present and limit the options before t he Presi dent . As noted 
earli er, the CI A offici al s were the only sources for options 
and t he de fenders of t he invasion. For example ~ Kennedy \<Jas 
con cerned that if the operation f ail ed , he woul d l ook very bad. 
Thi s percepti on on Kennedy 's part \'IOUld serve t o offset t he 
coerci ve effec t of calli ng the invasion off . Dulles and Bissell 
defined fail ure as an in feas ibl e option. No matte;" \•that happens , 
t hey ass ured the group, the force c:o.n make its \'lay t o t he neat·by 
mount ai ns und take up guerrill a operations . \~hat better way to 
d. ' L: t h ? 1 s posf~ o. .. em. In act ua 11 ty , l ess than a thi rd of the fotce 
had received guP.rr i 11 a tra·i ni ng; t he nearby mountains wet-e 
b1ocked by an impenetr·able swamp; t1nd t he i nvasion l eade1-s had 
been told to stay on the beaches o.nd \·lai t fo r United StatC>s 
support {Ge1b and Ha lpctin, 30~ Ihe -~~por~£!_, t·luy 11 , 1961; Cook, 
618; and Sorensen~ 1965, 302··303) . 1\t no time did any ll'!f!rnbel' of 
the ad!11i ni stl'·ati on question t lwse judgments by Dulles and B·i ssc11 . 
Du"l "les and Bi ssell wc1·e a.sked questions. and they ans\'Je1·ed them. 
Ho one even bothered to l ook at a mt~p s howi ng the S\'lamp. 
The CIA was also able to r ule out the del ay option, whi ch is 
a favorite of Presidents not eager for a pl an they cannot find a 
gcod reason to cancel . Ris i ng to the occas i on, Dulles and Bissell 
\'l v.ged a cl assic "now ot· never" argume:1t . Arguing that the 
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Guatemalian government \'las impatient \'lith the training of the 
refugees on its soi 1, that refugee morale was at its peak and 
would soon decline, that the rainy season \voul d soon turn the 
landing area to mud, and that Castro would soon receive jets 
from the Soviets, the CIA said it \·tould require the use of the 
United State t~ar·ines and Ail· Force to overthro•11 Castro after 
June 1 {Sch1 esinger, 239-240; Sorensen, 1965 , 295~296; and Gelb 
and Halperin, 31}. (In short, the Guatemalian government, the 
refugees, God, and the Soviet government \·Jere all enlisted in a 
push for an i!mlediate decision.) 
The CIA was not the only expert power-wielding force operating 
during the del iberations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did appt·ove 
of the plan' s militat"Y feasibility. Following a time-honored 
tradition (P.nison, 125), no one in the administration questioned 
the expert judgment of the Joint Chiefs. The mil.jor flm·1s of the 
pl an .. -the f ·irst night-t·ime am;:>h i bious landing ever and a 
forgotten or ignored cora l reef--rnude it 5Usceptible to questioning 
even by rel ative amateurs {John~on? i04) . 
But i t \·HiS not que:stioned. The e>:pert authority of the CIA 
and the Joint Chiefs was l argely accepted with little opposition. 
Til'~ fl ai\'S \'Jel"\! there to see. hut no one in authority 1 ooked. The 
necessary informution suggesting i:hc uprising Hould fail to 
matetitdize existed in and out of the ~JOV~rnments but no one saw 
it (llil sman, l97lp 130). Doubts about the plan existed but V/et'e 
not t•ai sed (Son~n~en, i 965 , 306) . 1\r'thur Sd1lcs ·ingcr \'ll~ote about 
this n<~glcct Df potential povter. H~ relates to us t hat t he 
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publicity the plan had received was easily sufficient to eliminate 
the element of surprise and blow the fragile cover story. The 
information vtas public knowledge {even in Time), "but no one 
in the interregnum seemed to feel final responsibility, and so 
matters drifted along" {Schlesinger, 235). The administration 
drifted into the perfect failure. 
The question nO'.'t becomes, why did those with the potentia 1 
to exercise po~mr respond 1·1ith only apathy? The effective 
exercise of povter requires both an attempt and a response. To 
"b 1 ame 11 the expe)·ts for attempting power exercise is to ignore 
the acceptance of that power attempt. \·lhy, then 5 did the group 
respond to the coercive povte r attempts? After all, the political 
damage done by failure exceeded any damage possible by cancella-
tion. Nhy, then, did the group pet·ceive as legitimate CIA 
domination of the ·j nformation and p1·estmtation processes? After 
all & the President and his senior advisors surely had legitimate 
claims to make as \-Jell. Hhy, then, did the gt·oup accept the 
expert po\'ter exerci sed by Dulles and Bissell? Other information 
\'las available if they had merely 1 ooked. In short, why did the 
group allm~ matters to drift along? 
These questions really ask v1hy those \-Jho could have exercised 
povter did not do so. For an ans1·1er, I tur~ to a 1·evi e\'J of the 
percc~pti ons and e>:pectutions of the group wh ich determined the 
exerci se of p01·1cr·. 
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Perceptions and Expectations of the Graue 
Maybe we've been overso 1 d on the fact that we 
can't say no to this. 
-Dean Rusk 
Rusk's reflective statement occurred several days before 
the final April 4 meeting, as he mulled the possibility of 
drav·ling up a balance sheet detailing the plan's advantages and 
disadvantages (Schlesinger, 257}. For whatever reason, the 
Secretat--y of State nevet· got at·ound to saying "no". The other 
deds·ion-maket·s considering the invasion plan vtere similarly 
oversold on the fact that they could not say no. Their own 
perceptions of the situation and expectations of the decision 
process overso1d them. 
I.he Reali zat·i Oll_.2.'E the _QJ~port~!.0..!l .. to Exet•ci se POi·ter 
The percept ual process limits the ability to r·ecognize or 
to realize opportunities for power utilization through the 
filtering and interpretative processes. 
F"il tet~i IJ.[ of Information. Presidents are dependent on theh· 
advisors for a wide variety of infonnation necessary for decis·ions 
(II a 1 pet~i n, 1972 , 310). Usually advisors have their m<~n ·interests 
and mot·ivations wlrich lead them to filter the infonnation t hey 
prnvide the Pres ·ident. Advis01~s \•Jill be under strong temptat·ion 
to provide the Pr-es ident only w\th infonnation he wou'ld like 
to hear or they would like hi m to hear (de Riveri a, 232 ) ~ 
In the case of the Bay of Pigs, Dulles and Bissell filtered 
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their information and the President's by excluding all of the 
concerned intelligence experts, including their own, from the 
informative process (Schlesinger, 248). In short, by controlling 
the sources of information, Dulles and Bissell filtered infonna-
tion available to the decision-makers. 
Another process of infonnati on filtering is simply to 
ignore or not "attend" t o relevant infonnation one does not 
wish to hear. In May of 1969 a carefully conducted poll of 
Cubans indicated strong support for the Castro government and 
virtually no hope of stimulating an uprising against Castro. 
A report of this poll and its conclusions Has Hidely cit·culated 
tht•oughout the government. Over five hundred copies were sent 
to the State Department. the Hhite House. and other 1·elcvant 
agencies. The New Yotk Ti mes carried a r·athcr detai1 ed ac:count 
---·----
st1·ess ing the 1·eport ' s conclus ions. Schl cs inger 9 reading the 
report aftet· the invas ion, \•ti shed he had seen it carl'ier. Despite 
the i rnp01·tance of the upt·ising in the invasi on's pl ann ·i ng , the 
l~epot't Nas never bt·ought to the att ention of the group (de Ri ve t'i a, 
41 -42 and Cant1·i1 ~ 4-5 ). Pres i dent Kennedy \'Ja5 actually aware 
of a repor t in the 1-le\'/ . .York Herald_ Jri bune wh ich conch!ded that 
Cast\"O had strong support among the Cuban pcop1 e, The negl ect of 
these two \~ports~ both avail able and at least ons known to 
the decision-makers~ suggests that in formation l'>'i.IS filt er·ed by 
the p~ycho l ogical des i re not to "see" it (~4a1 ton, 46 ) . 
~tet:~_retat.i on of Informati Q.ll· Once data is recogni zed, it 
i s still subject to t he interpretation of the indivi du<l l. Dull es 
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and Bissell were obviously so biased in favor of the plan that 
any negative infonnation \'lhich got through their filtering 
process would be likely to be interpreted 11 away11 • Bissell 
recognized the strength of his conmitment to the plan and \·larned 
the group to discount his bias (Schlesinger, 241). Dulles was 
apparently less open and candid \'lith himsel f and the group. To 
the bitter end, he blamed the invasion's failure on a cancelled 
second air str ike (Dulles, 176). Dulles and Bissell viewed 
information through the di started perspective of their ovm 
prejudice (Halperin, 1971, 73). 
John Kennedy and hi s closest advisors interpreted incoming 
informati on and issues in their own particular ovtay as \'/ell. 
Three forces colored their perspective of the issues : (1) the 
determined, t ough-mindadr.ess of a ne\'1, wi nning admi nistration; 
(2) the crusading anti-communism of John Kennedy; and fusi ng 
the firs t t'lto forces, (3) John Y.ennedy ' s tough , anti-Castro 
speeches during the campai gn. 
( l). The Kennedy adm·i ni strati on vi rtua lly S\·Jept into office 
\'lith the pol'"er, confidencet style, and determi nation to get 
Arnerica ooving <.tgain. The feeling and i mage of the new administra-
tion \'las one of viril·ity~ of toughness, and of action (Halberstram. 
39-41 ). Sorensen reports t hat doubts were. never expressed partly 
out of a fear· of being l abe"led ' soft' or undaring in the eyes of 
coll eagues (So1·ensen, 1965, 306). Sm·ensen, moreover, repot·ts 
that Kennedy perceived hi s approval "to be a test of his mettle" 
(Sorensen, "1965, 305~306 ) . Schlesinget~ a'lso notes t hat \•/hil e the 
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invasion's proponents could "strike virile poses", the opponents 
were afraid the CIA and the military would see them as "soft-
headed idealists" rather than the "really tough guys'1 they were 
(Schlesinger, 256). Remarkable admissions, these--unless one 
recognizes that the new administration did~ itself as "tough", 
"virile", and "daring". The rhetOl~ic and style of the Kennedy 
administration was not a public image--it was real. Virtually 
everything that was said must be seen in this fl'ame\'IOrk. Sure, 
John Kennedy \'las skeptical; sure, the plan was risky. But risky, 
bold plans \'tnre the type that appealed to "the Kennedy spirit". 
It \'las a plan of action and \'las therefore "irt·esistab"le" (Sidney, 
124). 
(2). Hhile not really fitting the stl-ong anti-communism 
mold of the i\cheson Ning of the party, John Kennedy Has not 11 about 
to rus h ahead of events ••• by calling fOl" changes in the almost 
glacierlike quality of the Cold Har." He \</as still a cold Harrior 
( Halberstram~ 21-24). In the 11 Spil' it of the Truman Doctri ne ," 
Kennedy eagerly sa\'t Soviet endm-sement of \'Iars of national liber-
ation as a ch&llenge to the United States (Ful brig~t, S29). 
Kennedy \<laS em er.thus·iastic supporter of methods to counter 
guel'·r'ill a warfare t seeing t hi s as the mechanism of Soviet power 
in the futurE~ (llalberstram, 409). Sor·ensen repol~ts that Kennedy 
hac\ excepti onu1ly st ~"ong anti -Castl'O fee 1 ings \·Jhi ch may huve 
effected hi s judgment (Sorensen, 30G) . After all, Castro was the 
ultimate example of a success ful revo lution (although when he 
b ec~.me Co1m:wn i st is a matte1· of d·i spute). 
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(3}. Kennedy's anti-communism and anti-Castroism, together 
with his action-oriented, "get America moving" pose, resulted in 
a political position which reflected and reinforced his bias. 
In a study of major Kennedy speeches, Eckhardt and White point 
out that the major expressed values were peace, military strength, 
nonaggression, and determination. Kennedy saw the Soviets as 
aggressive and less peace- loving than the United States (Eckhardt 
and Hhite, 326-328). Kennedy 's broad anti-com11uni sm focused on 
Castro parti cul arly . In the 1960 campai gn, Kennedy repeatedly 
pressed Nixon on the do- noth ·ing posi t ion of the Eisenhctr'ler 
admini stration (not knowing of the Bay of Pigs pl anni ng). He 
spoke of the need for a "serious off ens i ve 11 agains t Castro, pre-
sumab ly by t he anti -Castro fo1·ces \·lho offe red eventua 1 hope of 
overth ro\'ling Cas tro. These "fi ghte1·s f Oi" freedom", he noted , 
"have had vi rtua 11y no s upport f r om OUI" government 11 (\~a 1 t on, 
36M38) 5 In shot~t , Kennedy ' s rhetori c t ef lected hi s strong 
ant i - conmuni sm and his acti on-or i entation. Hi s rhetori c 
certainly provided t he bas i s to whatever coer ci ve power the CIA 
exercised over him. 
Hhether hi s t"hetor·i c reflected his attitude or l'lhet her, as 
Sorensen and Schles inger report ~ hP. \'Ius skepti cal an d agai nst the 
p1nn, v1e cannot be certni no Popul at l eade1·s t end to be li eve 
the i t own rhet ori c (Frank s 173-174) . t~oreover, Acheson l'eports 
an early conversation \'lith John Kennedy \'lhi ch indicates the 
Pres ident' s commitment to the pl an 1'/uS grea.ter thcl.ll Sc:lll esi ngel~ 
and Sorensen ~': OL(ld haVl~ us bel i eve (1-la"lton, 44) . He mus t remember , 
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of course, that Sorensen learned of Kennedy's skepticism after 
the invasion failed. And schlesinger may have been overly eager 
to find support in his President. At any rate, Kennedy was 
mindful that "history depends on who writes it" and may have been 
covering his tracks. r~ost likely, I suppose, is that Kennedy 
was a man of contrasts. After all, skepticism of a bold and 
daring plan may have existed along vlith an irrestible attract ion 
to it, because it was bold and daring action. 
These petceptua 1 influences he 1 p explain Robert Kennedy • s 
press uring of Schlesinger. Mo reover, the view of a tough-minded, 
anti~communist, action-oriented Kennedy would be sommoJhat 
favorable tovtards the pl an. The coercive power of the CIA is 
reinforced by Kennedy 's perception. His \•li 11 i ngness to accept 
the legitimate and expert power influences of the CIA are more 
understa.ndab 1e when \oJ·e l'ecogni ze that he \'/anted to accept such 
influences. In sho1·t, v1e no\'1 have the picture of a skeptical 
and worried President--\'Jhat if the invasion should fail? But 
the Pr·esident \'las also attr·acted by this bold p·l an of action--
\oJhat if it \<Jorks? John Kennedy v1anted to be cony_}_!l_£ed it v1ould 
succeed. He \oJas l~eady and willing to respond t o the pm·Jer· 
exercised by Dulles and Bissel l. 
Jh e_~J?.P..!:9.Pt'i Qte~~ss of the Exercise of Powe l~ 
Po\'ler is effectively exercised only in si tuations where it 
·is appropriate or "right". Rusk ' s f eeling of being "ovetsold" is. 
t o a lclrge degree~ the result. of a feel'ing of inappropriateness 
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associated \'lith the use of power. This feeling of inappro-
priateness helps explain the failure to act of many who could have 
exercised power. Appropriateness is detennined by the group's 
etiquette, roles, and its task/interpersonal orientation. 
Etiquette . The decision-makers in the Bay of Pigs interacted 
by a code of politeness and cordiality. The 11 aura of assumed 
consensus 11 which hung over the group was the result of a non-
critical atnX>sphere. Jan·is' interpretation of the non-challengi ng 
demeanor is that it reflected the intet•persona 1 attraction between 
Dulles and Bissell and the decision-making group (Janis, 1972, 46-
47). I have already indicated that the referent power of Dulles 
and Bissell \·ras limited and that the attraction Janis sees v1as 
l argely a t~esult of expert pm>~er. In light of this interpretation, 
ho\'1 does one exp 'ta·in the undeniable presence of a norm against 
cri tical chnll enge cf the plan? As vre shall see shortly, the 
interpersonal or i entation of the group operat ed to support an 
etiquette of pol ite, fri endly interaction. The group was tra?ped 
in an image of sophi stication which dictated t he genteel , club-
li ke atmosphere. The operation of an intet·personal m·i entation 
implies a code of conduct more general than the t aboo ag ainst 
antagonizing ne\·l mernbet·s sugges t ed by Janis. 
Rol es. Role conceptions operate to define our area of 
acceptab le or appropri at e behavior. In at l east fo ul'' cases, t he 
rol e concepti ons of t he members of the decision group operated 
t o 1inrit the exerci se of pm1er. The exercise of pm'ler by Dulles, 
ll i sse~ 11 p Rcbe1·t Kennedy, and Dean Rusk \·1as seen by each as an 
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appropriate activity. 
Arthur Schlesinger reports that he felt a mere historian 
and Presidential aid had little right questioning the heads of 
maj01· departments. Schlesinger felt that as an aid, he could 
speak at the request of the President but ought not to volunteer 
his criticisms (Schlesinger , 240). Of course, the deference of 
a subordinate tmvat·ds his superior is a classic example of role 
limitations. 
Chester Bmvles was limited in his exercise of powet~ by a 
similar deference. Upon learning of the invasion, Bowles did · 
not press his criticisms in the absence of his boss. Instead , 
he waited until Rusk l'etumed to ask permission to express his 
dissent (Schl es in9er, 251 ). Certu.in"ly , 13cMlest response to 
Rusk's desire f c:r him not to press hi s case is a clear matte•~ of 
subor·dinate ro·ies. But Bo\'Jles' silence in Rusk'.~. abs~ce 3 \~hen 
as Act·i ng Secretary he could be f!xpected to speak out, is the 
result of his sp<~ci al definit·ion of his ovm t•ole as Acting 
Secreta l''.Ye 
Dean Rusk himself never got around to expressing his doubts 
or permitting Bo~t l es to express his. At the center of Rusk' s 
remarkabl e si'!ence v1as hi s concept of the t•ole of a Secretary of 
State. Fonow·ing the example of hi s mentor and nca1~-herop 
Secretary Geor'ge Mal'shall , Rusk sav1 hi msel f as a counselor and 
med·i a tor, not as an advocate or critic. Rusk "seemed t o fee 1 that 
it \'las inappropr·int.e fo r the secre tary of state to do battle ·i n 
the name of the department" (Hi"l sman ~ 1971 , 169). Rusk's role 
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as judge and person~l counselor to the President meant that the 
political considerations that are the State Department's concern 
are defended by an assistant secretary, if at all (Hilsman, 1971, 
169). In the case of the Day of Pigs, they were defended by no 
one. Dean Acheson, a different kind of Secretary of State, when 
asked vthat it took to perform his job replied, 11 a killer instinct 11 
{Hilsman, 1967, 59). Dean Rusk was not a killer in the sense that 
Acheson vtas. 
Rusk's um'li llingness to exercise the pm'ler of his office due 
to the limitations of his role concept is beautifully sunmarized 
by David Halberstram : 
Rusk had a great sence of the funct'i on of the 
office; he believed in people playing their parts, 
that and no more. He believed that if the 
Secretary nnd the President did not agree, it \·las 
virtually a constitution al crisis. When Rusk set 
fortl1 hi s viev1s forcefully at a National Security 
Counci l mee ting it was a sure ~ ign th at he had 
already conferred vlith the Pres ident , found that 
they agreed and thus had been encouraged to speak 
out \'/ithin the blweaucracy. But in al"l this, 
there was one curious anomu ly; Rusk , \'tho had 
t•i sen to Hhat \•tas the second most povterful 
posi t ·i on ·j n the nation, did not really covet 
power.~·· He was a modest man in a job which does 
not entail modesty but demands that the incumbent 
f ight and dominate an entire area of policy 
making (Halbet~str-am, 345). 
Rusk d·id no t f i ght, and so the battle \·Jas lost by default. 
The operation of role limi tations on other Presidential 
advisors is less clear. Sorensen ur·ites that many advisors look 
upon it as their "role" to be 11 medi ato t~s" \·lho support the 
consensus \~hich seems to be developing in order to aid the 
Pres ident (S orensen, 1963, 61). Nat'ional Security Advisor tkGcot·ge 
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Bundy clearly sa\'/ himself as a mediator, whose role was to see 
that every vievt was examined (Anderson, 324-325). Bundy's role 
in the Bay of Pigs is not \'tell documented, but it certainly \'las 
not the fulfillment of the media tor role--seeing that a 11 vi e\'IS 
\'tere fairly examined. Perhaps that role concept developed in 
the aftermath of the 11 perfect fai 1 ure". 
Task/Interpersonal yl~ientatit?n. The Kennedy administration 
assumed office \'lith a strong sense of espirit de corps. Their 
style, their brains, their winning- -everything was "all-star" 
(Halberstram, 39-40). Upon assuming office, Kennedy and his 
advisors had a sense of "enonnous confidence" in their luck. 
They had \'/On the nomination and the elections against all odds 
and nll comers. Thus, entered the ne\'1 administration as the 
\·rinni ng team (Sch 1esi nger, 259). The sense of togetherness, the 
feel ing of bei r.g on a \'1i nni ng team? and the fri en d'ly demeanor of 
the group's meetings all suggest an orientation tO'Ytards inter-
personal rc lations rather than tO'dards tasks. 
An interpersonal ori entation is r.1arked by cooperative» non-
challenging interaction among members. The g}~oup does not Ni sh 
to stress differences in po\'le t~, so no challenge of asserted po> .. ler 
is made. It i s easy to see h0\'1 Dull es and Bissell, \•lho did not 
feel the euphoria of the new day, Here able to step in, exert 
their power~ and go unchallenged. To challenge the r espected 
experts Nould have been to spoil the Nhole feeling. No one felt 
the r es ponsibility because no one cared that much about the task 
at hand. 
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The Desirability of the Exercise of Povmr 
The interpersonal orientation produces an atmosphere of 
consensus since there is a friendly, cooperative character to 
the interaction among members. The atmosphere of consensus, 
in turn, reduces the willingness of members to use power, since 
the desirability of power exercise is partly dependent upon a 
feeling of potential success. In the interpersonal oriented 
group, members do not perceive the possibility of success and 
accordingly suppress their doubts. 
Presidential advisors , like virtually anyone, are afraid 
to take a stand alone. They fear that they vii 11 earn the 
reputation of a nu·isance Ol" incUl" the 11 dis approbation 11 of the 
gl"Oup (Sorensen, 1953, 62 and de Riveria~ 233). Schlesinger 
reflects the feeli ngs of one advisor who held back in antiC'ipaM 
tion of failure vJhich 1•1ould 11 have accomplished l'itt1e save to 
ga·in me a nume as c1 nuisance 11 (Schl es ·inger, 255). Rusk, too, 
held back at the \·/hite House meetings, though he \'las a 11 penetrating 11 
ques tioner at State Department meetings (Hil sman, 1967» 58). 
Assuming the uncritical approach of the interpersonal orien~ 
tation meant agreement, the deci sion-makers felt that the exp1~ssion 
of their ovm doubts would be a f uti 1 e effort that could do them 
hann. Perhaps they \•Je re mindful of the des i r ability of protecting 
their future p01-1er by not I'/ as t i ng 'it on a 1 os t cause ( Hil sman, 
1969, 365}. At any rate, the deci si on-makers may have seen the 
desirability of p01-1e r exerci se as li m'itect by the appearance of 
"un animity" and "ass umed consensus" (Jani s , 1972, 38-39). 
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In st.nrrnary, the Bay of Pigs decision was a decision made 
by a cohesive group of men under heavy pressures for confot~ity. 
The direction of confonnity pressures was to.'lards the policy 
options advocated by the most effective user of power, the CIA. 
Dulles and Bissell relied heavily upon the expet~t pa .. 1er they 
possessed through control of infot·mation and options to dominate 
eve ry meeting. A subtle use of coer-cive and legitimate po~tJel" 
and the limited use of referent power backed up the influence 
exe rci sed fr om knoi'l ledge and competence . 
l~hy '"as the CIA allcro'led to be the only sout·ce of expert 
power? Why was the coer ci ve power effective in li ght of the 
more pai nfu1 po 1 i ti ca 1 consequences of defeat? The ans\·Jers to 
these ques ti ons are to be found in the perceptions and expecta-
ti on:> of the group . The percepti on of t he Kennedy admin is tra t ion 
of the deci s·i on process wo.s bi ased towards acceptance L>y the 
PresidP.nt's tough. action-or·i ented ant·i-ct'lfJ1J!lun ism. The l'ole 
l i mi tati ons of scvera ·l major ad vi so~s kept them from expr~ss i ng 
t he doubts \'/hi ch v10ul d have disturbed the 11 atmosphere of assumed 
consens us" which hung ove l~ the group's meeting~:. /\nd finally ,, 
tile inte-rper·$ona1 orientv.t·lon of a new adrninist1·at.i on Heakened 
concer·n fat· the task at hand.~" No one accepted fi nal respon~dbi 'l ity,nt-
Llcct~use thete 1·:as more con cern with gettinq a'i ong than 1·rith getting 
th0. job don~. The "i '11 us ion of un<111i m·i tyn \'lh i ch resulted from the 
cooperative i friendly atmosphere of i nterp£!rsona 1 or·i entation 
opE-~ i~atcd t o t~educe the des·irc~ to exerc·ise povtet· by members \!Jho sa\>J 
the i l' effort~ as f11ti 1 e and even har1.1ful . The members of the 
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administration had been "oversold" on their inability to say 
no to the invasion plan, but it is doubtful that they ever knew 
what hit' them. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AFTERI,1ATH TO THE BAY OF PIGS: 
PRELUDE TO THE CUBAN HISSILE CRISIS 
It's a hell of a way to learn things, but I 
learned one thing from this business--that is, 
that \'le \'lill have to deal with the CIA. 
-John Kennedy 
John Kennedy's view of the Bay of Pigs as an embarrassing 
learning device made possible by the CIA reflects the attitude 
of the entire administration. Hilsman writes that the lessons 
of the Bay of Pigs enabled Kennedy to avoid future mistakes 
·in the Missile Crisis (Hilsman, 1967, 30). Soren~en reports 
that Kennedy Has later 11 gr-ate ful that he had learned so many 
major lesson: ••• at so reliltive'Jy sma"ll and temporal'Y a cost11 
(Sotensen, 1965 ~ 308) ., And Schlesinger concludes that the 
l essons learned in t he failur-e turned t he Bay of Pigs from a 
"mi sfortune11 to a 11 benefit 11 vv hich 11 Contdbuted to success in 
Cuba i~ 1962" ( Schlesinger~ 297). 
Hhat did they thi nl< they ho.d l earned? Hho Nas, after John 
Kennedy's almost pt·etent.ious acceptance of full l~espor.sibility 11 
r-eally the 'fifthe t" of defeat'! The majot' analysis of the invasion 
by Sor~nsen probably cl osely reflects Presi clenti a·l thi nki n~J . 
. -
Sorensrm learm;d of t he invasion only after- it fail ed thtough 
e>:tens ive di!>tuss·ions with John Ke nnedy. And \'thile this afte \"~· 
thc~~ fi:lct process may 'li mit Sm"enscn' s creditabi'lity \·/hen sp.~ak·ing 
about whnt happened, ·it ·inc1-eases hi s creditetuili t y when speaking 
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about what Kennedy thought happened. 
Hhile recognizing Kennedy's errors, Sorensen's thrust is 
towards the failures of the CIA. "It was clear to him, 11 Sorensen 
writes, "that he had · in fact approved a plan bearing little 
resembl ance to what he thought he had approved. Therein lies 
the key to the Bay of Pigs decision 11 (Sorensen, 1965, 301). 
Sorensen attributes the gap bebteen reality and Presi dential 
perception to the ne\'mess of the administration, the pt-essutes 
of time, secrecy , and the disorgani zation of crisis planning. 
Implicit in Sorensen's analysi s is that the newness of the 
administration li mited Kennedy 's judgment of his advi sors 
{1neaning he did not question "the recogni zed experts ") . The 
pressures of ti me an d secrecy i mposed by t he CI/\ limited "realis t ic 
a1ternatives 11 and res ulted in 11 00 reali s tic apprai sa111 , and no 
strong 11 Voice of opposit:ion". And whil e t he ne\1  admi nistrati on 'I'Jas 
not yet organi zed for crisi s planning, ot her's s uch as the CIA and 
the J oi nt Chi efs \'H!t' e ( Sm·Ems~m , 1965 , 304·~ 305 ). In s hor t , the 
11 experts 11 in the CIA and t he ,Joint Chiefs \-J e1·e cl early the 
vill ains of the Kennedy pi ece and t he "f nthers 11 of defeat. Robert 
Kennedy ref lect ed John Kennedy' s react·ion t o the defeat by telling 
an aide the day after t he fai l ure that on t he bas i s of t he in for-
mnti on prf! Sented, the deci s ion \·Jas correct . "But 9 11 he conti nued~ 
11 t he ·information \~as not \'tho'lly accu1·ute " (Guthmnn. 112). 
The fi t·s t t angi b 1e chan ge ·in t he admi ni strati on i n the 
afte m1at h of t he f3tty of Pi gs rcf l ects t he 1 essons Kennedy thought 
he had 'learned. The power and cohes i on of t he 11 9enerali sts 11 i n 
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the administration increased while the power and attractiveness 
of the 11 experts 11 declined. Bundy and Sorensen gained great 
influence on Kennedy (Anderson, 241). Horeov~r, Kennedy, a 
generalist by nature, called around him men vthom he, in effect, 
licensed to be generalists and to do what generalists do best--
namely, question and distrust e~perts (Anderson, 234 and Guthman, 
114) . Bundy•s influence in particular increased in the \'lake of 
the apathy of Dean Rusk at State. Bundy• s office became a 
virtual "littl e State Department11 , often dominating that 
department in the foreign policy process (Halperi n, 1972, 31 5-
316 and Anderson, 318u319). 
The second result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs vtas 
the incl·ease in the toughness and determination of John Kennedy. 
Kennedy felt he had appeared indec-isive to Khrushchev. The 
tough-nrlnded realists in the administration were strengthened. 
Kennedy looked f'Or\'lard to his June meet ing vlith Khrushchev in 
Vienna as the battleg1·ound 1·1here he could show Khl'Ushchev, face-
to-face, that he 1·1as as tough as the old Russian. The Pres ident 
left Vienna badly shaken by the bu11ing given hirn by the ol der 
Khrus hchev. By the end of Vienna. and the Bay of Pigs, John 
Kennedy sal't his central probl em 1·1i th Khrushchev to ba one of 
convincing the Russ i an of his deten1ti nation and net~ve (George, 
98~99 and ll a lbEr~;tram~ 72). 
Bundy, the tough and ll CI'l l .Y povterful advisor, commented in 
hi s calm, cool nwnner on the day after the i nvas·ion failed ~ "just 
a brick thtou~1h the \'tindm·l (Halberstram, 67"'68). A brick, the 
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feeling \'Jas clear, thrown by the experts. And so the experts 
were banished and the administration proceeded to the brink of 
nuclear war in the missile crisis, confident a valuable lesson 
had been learned. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CUBAN tHSSILE CRISIS 
It \'las nrM up to one single man. No comnittee 
was going to make this decision. 
-Robert Kennedy 
Almost every President is reluctant to overrule 
the determined opposition of his advisors as he 
is to ve t o an act of Conqress. He rules, to a 
degree, not only wi th their advice but with 
thei \' consent. 
-Theodore Sorensen 
Robert Kennedy s trains for a cl i rnax in his dramatic story 
\'/hen he 1·1rites that, folloh' ing days of deliber ation by a group 
of advisors, the final decision would be one man's. A~ Sorensen 
notes, that singl e man would be highly unli ke ly to re ject the 
adv·ice of a convnittee of advi sors including hi s bJ~othe l" and most 
trusted f t ·iends. He deci dedt then , vlith their advice and the ·il~ 
consent. John l(ennedy hi mself udmi tted that t he s upport of the 
majority for t he course "He finally t ook ••• made it much easier11 
to decide (Sorensen. 1963, 8'1 ). The s tory of John Kennedy ' s 
deci sion i s, then~ t he story of a gl"Oup of advisors s triving 
amidst conflict. for consensus. 
The Dec·i sion ~ Conformitv 
··--- ·- -...-----"-
!laving been ·infomed of the i nte l'J'i gence data indi catinq t he 
pr-esence of Sovi et offens ive nriss i1 es in Cubu . lJolm V.ennedy pulled 
hi ~; closest advi sors ar0tmd hirn. The foUI~tec n men inc'ludcd 
11acJ~ rJna ~~a , Bundy ~ the ne\'-! CIA o·i rector John l·~cCone, 's-!wensen ~ 1\..nul 
Nitzc the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Allison, 185). 
The gt"oup, designated ExCom, met intensively from Tuesday, 
October 16, until the final decision on Saturday morning, October 
20. In the beginning, these men 11\'lhistled many different tunes." 
Before the final decision on Saturday "a majot~ity whist led a single 
tune: the blockade" (Allison, 200 and Janis, 1972, 144). The 
pr'Ocess by vthi ch this consensus emerged is a process of pov1er. 
On the first day the choice seemed to 1 ie betv-Jeen an air 
stt·ike or some non-military option such :1s diplomatic action. 
The non-military course \·Jas supported for·cefully by t\'!o po\'terfu l 
advocates -- Robert r ~lacNamara and HcGeorge Bundy. Dean Acheson, 
Paul tlitze, Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the Treasur.v ), and Dean 
Rusk forcefully opposed the non-military alternatives. The 
President indiciltcd his t·ejection of such action at the outset of 
the meeting and a.t the end confiY1ned h·is continued desire for 
mil·itary action . 13y \·Jednesday, October 17. the non-mil itary 
altematives \'/ere virtually i gnored as the ExCom focused on t vto 
mil itary alternatives: tile air stt·ike and the blockade (seQ 
Alli son~ 200-20?. and Sch1es·inger, 803) . 
On th at Tues day and 1·/ednesday , the a·i r stri l~e seemed to 
appen l 3 trongly to the members of Ex Com. Kennedy • s pteference 
is revealed in a Wednesday conversation with United Nations 
fl.mb assado i~ 1\dlai Stevenson . 11eeting on l·!ed;'lesday, October 17, 
\·lithout the campaign·in9 President , l·lacNumara first 1nunched an 
attack on the air strike al ternative . Moved by visi ons of nuclear 
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disaster, MacNamara switched his support to the naval blockade 
as a vtay of blocking the more harsh air strike. Robert Kennedy 
may have S\'tung the balance of support towards the blockade when 
he joined f1acNamara by al~guing the moral superiority of a 
b 1 ockade to a surprise 11 Pearl Harbor" type of attack. Dean 
Acheson sharply dismissed Kennedy's rnot~al argument and his 
analogy with Pearl Harbor as emotional and intuitive rather than 
serious and analytical. 13y the time John Kennedy returned on 
Hednesday ni ght, 1·1acNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Sorensen ·had 
formed a 11 tt~ipl e a11iance 11 in support of the blockade. The Joint 
Chiefs, tkCone, nusk, Nitze, and Acheson lined up behind the 
blockade (Allison, 202-204 ; So rensen, 1965, 683-634; Schlesinger, 
804~ 807; Robert Kennedy , 37-42 ; and Acheson, 76). 
On Thursd~y» Oct ober 18s ExCom continued to meet \'tithout the 
F'l~es·ldent. The bl ockade (~me rged as the choi ce of the majority. 
Th ot r~ vcni ng t he Pres ·j dent re tumed to the group for a rneeti ng 
runni ng we l l past midni ght . At t hat meeting Dill on switched and 
joined t he bl oclwde g l~oup l argely on t he basis of Robe rt Ke nnedy 's 
mora'l at·guments. nundy al so switched ove r on t he bas i s of 
1·1acNar:mra •s argument for "maintaininQ th£~ options" by beginning 
I.Yith b"l ockade and moving t o an ait~ str ike if neces$ary . The 
Pres i dent indi cvted a "tentat i ve ded s i on11 in f avor of the bl ockade 
and ordered Sorensen t o begin speech \'ll~it i ng (Ahel 7 80- 81 ; Al 'li son~ 
205; Robert Kennedy, 43-46; c.::·td Sorensen ) 19G5t 69 1) . 
On Fri day , Oct ober 19 , as the Pres i dent prepared t o leave on 
another campaign tri p t o keep up appearances ~ the Joi nt Chi efs 
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prevailed upon him to delay his flight in order to plead for an 
air stt"ike or an invasion. FollcMing this meeting, Kennedy 
called Sorensen, disgusted with the continued conflict, and 
directed him and the Attorney General to "pull the group together 
quickly." Friday motning \'/hen ExCom met, it was clear the 
President had left behind a restless group of advisors. Acheson 
still waged \'lar against the blockade option. Bundy was again 
uncertain of his earlier choice. /\nd Rusk expressed his usual 
mild doubts. And, of courset the Joint Chiefs were certain 
about v1hat they thought v1as necessary for the nation • s security. 
Robert Kennedy, striving for consensus, flatly stated that his 
brotl1£!:. could nevet~ order a surprise ai t" stt~ike. Sorensen, 
t1·ading off his special relationship vlitll t he President and 
frus trated by his infla.med u1 cer~ \'larned that "v1e at•e not serving 
the President \·te11. 11 By ni ghtfall Friday, the air str·ike vtas a 
lost cause . Oean Acheson, the leader of the air strike proponents, 
left fot· his l~aryl and fann feeling he had come to the end of his 
usefulness. Robert Kennedy then called the Pt·r.si dent ·in Chicago 
and told him the group vtas 11 ready to meet \'Jith him11 (Abe l, 83-89s 
Allison, 207··208 ; Sch les inger, 806~80 7; Sorensen, 1965 , 692~ 693 ; 
and Robert Kennedy, 47-48). 
On Satut~day ~ October 20, the group approved or ac:qui esced in 
the o·lockade option. Far from un animity, a stt~<\\'1 vote indicat ed 
eleven fo r t he blockade and s i x fm~ the ai r strike. /\lthough 
voting for the b·l ockade, the Pl~es i dent stn~ssed th at it was a 
first step only , whi ch di d not rule out a future air strike. 
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Sorensen \'lrites· in exaggeration that by the time the President 
finished, "those members of our group \'lho had cane to the meeting 
still advocating an air strike or invasion had been essentially 
\'Ion over by the course he outlined... The v1eakness of the 
confonnity p1'ocess Sorensen sees is reflected in the bitter 
battles which intnediately broke out over the diplomatic moves 
to accompany the blockade and in the frequent conflicts throughout 
the remainder of the crisis, as ExCom faced the choices forced by 
the "maintaining the options 11 approach (Allison, 208-209; Sorensen, 
1965, 694; Schlesinger, 808-809; Robert Kennedy, 48; and Gem·ge, 
127-128). 
Hos t members of the Kennedy circle viewed the missile crisis 
decision p'f'Ocess as the antithesis of the Bay of Pi gs process. 
It \'las fOl' them the ultimate test of the lessons they had leatned. 
It Has a ·imos t a.n atonement for· past sins (see !1acNamara in R. 
Kenned_y, 14 and Guthman, 112) . Irving Janis likevlise sees the 
missil e crisis as the 11 counterpoint" of the failures of the Cuban 
fiasco a year and a half before. J ani s credits the group with an 
openness and willingness to criticize th at existed despite the 
nonna l conformity pressures. This openness \'las the t·esu lt , Jan·is 
feels, of a ne;'/ group norm operating to require cr-iticism (Janis, 
1972 ~ 142- 150). The question is~ then, to \'/hat extent did pressures 
tm·nn·us con fonni ty operate? Conformity pressures operate, if 
successf"u1 s to reduce openness and cr-itici s m, once a consensus has 
nm2rgcd. 
Jani s himself indicates an occas ional doubt about the openness 
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of the ExCom. John Kennedy forced his decision on the group for 
a mi 1 i tary option, and 11acNamara and Bundy qui ck1y abandoned 
their position in the face of Presidential opposition (Janis, 
1972, 142). One cannot escape the feeling that the President 
decided in favor of the blockade on Hednesday, and the discussions 
Thursday and Friday Here to 11 bri ng the hawks around" (Hil sman, 
1971, 129-130). After all, the President must have the support 
of his advisors, and persuasion is a more lasting force than is 
command (Hilsman, 1971, 24-25 and Neustadt, 34). 
The "e.ngineers of consensus" on Thursday and Friday were 
Robert Kennedy and Sorensen, \-Jho acted on the basis of their 
special relationships to "bring the group around11 on Friday and 
to solidify the conversi ons of Dillon and l3undy (Alli son, 207-
209). The psychological rejection of Acheson, indicated by 
his sudden depar t ure and bitter attitude, and the subsequent 
attacks on Stevenson for his Saturday argument for patient 
diplomacy, indicate the operation of a strong conformity pressure 
(Ha1berstl'am, 28 ; Halton, 119; and Allison, 209). 
Despite the conformity pressures, Jani s is right to a degreeo 
There \'tas D.n openness of conflict and a di sp 1 ay of pm'ler present 
in the ~rlssi 1e crisis decision-making process that was absent in 
the 13ay of Pi~J!;. The exercise of pmver, so c1ea1· and so diverse, 
determined \'thi ch opt·i on th at the eventua 1 confonni ty pressures 
would opernte around. 
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The Effective Exerci se of Power 
And Crispin Crispin shall ne'er go by, 
From this day to the ending of the world, 
But we in it shall be remembered; 
We fe\'1, \<Je happy fev1, we band of brothers. 
-Shakespeare 
The Bard's comment about the end of the world has a slightly 
frighteni ng note to it in conjunction with the missile crisis. 
More frightening is the fact that the sense of comradeship in 
ams represented by the Bard v-1as a favorite piece of Kennedy 
verse (John Kennedy often referred to his adv i sOl~s as 11\·Je ban.d of 
btothers 11 ). The role of these feeli ngs of an eli te esoirit de 
... --.~-- -
corps in the determination of the outcome of ExCom deli berations 
was a si gnificant one. 
Re\'tard Pm·ter 
/my President or any Secretary of State exerci scs reward 
powet~ over· his advisors . The pm<~e r of a Pres i dent to rm·tard 
advi sors he likes or appreciates i s a natural function of the power 
of the office (Heustadtt 179). Seen in this li ght , the President ' s 
ini t ial instruct i ons to ExCom that "something be done11 seems 
capa.ble of produc-ing tile quick retreat of 1'1acNumara and Bundy. 
Afte r all~ qi vcn the determined oppositiot) of their superior, 
they had much to gain hy conformity. 
Coc rci ve P01·1er 
Opposi t i on t o a superior also threatens the punishment a 
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superior can often exercise. Certainly, John Kennedy did not 
thr-eaten 13undy and t·tacNamara, but they must have been mi ndful of 
the treatment Chester Bm·lles received following the 13ay of Pigs. 
And John Kennedy's harsh treatment of Adlai Stevenson's late 
Saturday dissent must have served notice to those \•lho contem-
plated future deviance. 
Kennedy sharply attacked Stevenson at the Satw~day 
meeting, leaving Stevenson badly \•Jounded (Abel, 95-96). t1oreover, 
despite repeated denials, subsequent press stories quoting a high 
Hhite House official as sayin9 Stevenson 11\·/anted a t1unich" and 
generally being hi9hly critical of the UH ambassador's role \•Jere 
"leaks" from Kennedy. A magazine editor has revealed that the 
Munich l ine was from Kennedy hi ms elf, who insisted it be printed. 
As in the Bmtles case, Kennedy Has not adverse to using the 
damaging coercive pov1er of "leaks 11 to punish those \'lho crossed 
him \•Jhen he \'las in no mo od fot• it (Halberstram , 27). 
Coercive pm·1e1· is also exercised by a dissenter in a 
Pres i dential deci sion. The use of leaks to charge a l ack of 
consultation or just to distort the picture of the decision 
process (as Kennedy in Stevenson's case) i s a major source of 
coercive power (Sorensen, 1963, 80 ). Certainly, Acheson, the 
Joint Chiefs, and Stevenson as dissenters . possessed this 
potenti a 1 pm·1er. 
But John Kennedy 's response to this potenti al threat was 
to cover hi s tr·acks carefully. Kennedy ' s blockade decision 
was carefully phrased as a first step only to reflect his desire 
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for a clear record (Hilsman, 1971, 129-130). Further, the 
President met i ndi vi dually to consult \·lith Acheson, thus 
weakening Acheson's basis for ccxnplaint (Allison, 207). Kennedy 
personally sought the advice of the Air Force Tactical Comm and 
on the military feasibility of a surgical air stri ke and del ayed 
his Friday trip to hear out the militaty , t hus weakening their 
cl ai ms to inadequate counsel {Allison, 124 and 206). Stevenson. 
consulted late on Saturday, October 20, mi ght have fel t shut out , 
but Kennedy attacked Stevenson f irst in an effort t o discredi t 
any future criti d sm Stevenson mi ght make. In shot~t , John 
Kennedy ' s response t o t he possibil ity of punis hment was to cover 
hi s t racks , not t o fo 11 0\'J the pat h of dissent. 
Referent PO'.<Jer 
John Kennedy \'loul d cl ear·)y have been less able and \'li 11 ing 
t o offset the coerci ve effects of di ssenter·s i f MacNamat·a t 
So remsen, and his brother had been among them. But the refel~ent 
pov:er of these thr~e made i t unli ke ly that he evet· considered 
opposing them. 
Rober t Kennedy ' s influence over hi s brother is vJell -kno\'/n 
and extensive. lie exerci sed a personal, int imate infl uence 
unsurpnssed by il.nyone el se. Sorensen ' s infl uence \'laS mo1"e 
-
genen lli zed but equal ly strong in i ts ovm \\'ay. Sorensen was a 
mnn virtual ly absorbed by John Kennedy. He sai d vti thout 
embar-rassment or regret that he "h ad given eleven years " of his 
l ife for John Kennedy, and fol' hi m duri ng t hat time, "he (John 
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Kennedy) \1/as the only human being \•tho mattered." His 1963 
divorce is perhaps understandable. At any rate, Sorensen was 
the major liberal influence on John Kennedy's political thinking 
(Anderson, 223-224). Robert HacNamara \·las si milarly a personal 
friend and a popular and much-admired figure in the Kennedy 
circle (Halberstram, 245-246). 
Of course, all of these men Nere influenced by the President 
and by interpersonal attraction. MacNamara, for example, became 
a virtual "br·other" in the Kennedy family, being called upon 
many times in the tragedi es that fell upon them in t he years 
ahead. Asked once \'tho his friends Nere, MacNamara could only 
say, "the Kennedys--1 like the Kennedys" (Halberstram, 223- 224). 
Sorensen' s devotion to Kennedy is pai nful1y obvious, and he 
took much ribbing due to his tendency to copy even the social 
mannerisms of his President (Andet·son, 242 ). The attracti on 
beU.tecn Robert Kennedy and Robert 1·1acN amara which grev1 during 
the missile crisis receives eloquent testi mony from 1'1acNamara's 
for\·lard to Kennedy' s book : "And cotm1on expos Ul~e to danger forges 
bonds and understand·i ng betvteen men stronger than those fonned 
by decades of close association. So it \'las that I came t o kna.'l, 
aclmi re ~ and 1 ove Robet' t F. Kennedy by his behavior dut•i ng the 
Cuban mi ss "il e crisis" (in R. l(ennedy, 13) . 
Thus, the suppot•ters of the blockade fonned a "tri ple 
alliance 11 of the Pres i dent's natural fri ends , supporters, and 
11 urot hel'S11 • Conttast this gt·oup of natura 1 associates with the 
group of outsiders suppot·t ing the air strike: Acheson , t1cCone, 
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the Joint Chiefs, and (sometimes ) Rusk. 
Acheson has made his personal aversion to the process of 
decision-making in ExCom quite clear. His personal dislike 
for the emotional Robert Kennedy and his bitter and intense 
exchanges \'lith the President • s brother could not he 1 p but a 1 i en ate 
Acheson from John Kennedy . Moreovet~, Kennedy was posed between 
the Stevenson and Acheson foreign policy \'lings of his party and 
thus found it difficult to be personally attracted to either man 
(Hal berstram, 21-24; Acheson, 76-77; and Abel, 64-65). 
John l~cCone • s appoi ntmcnt as Dit-ector of the CIA ~wul d be 
comparab le in shock value and diversity of opinion to, say, 
Richard Nixon's appointment of Daniel Ellsberg. McCone was a 
California milli onaire ~lith a tarnished right \'ling~ He Has 
John Kennedy's third choice and \'las primarily a political ploy 
to keep the conservatives on the Hill off his back. That McCone 
did p but it did not \'lin him v.ny popularity contests at the White 
House. For examp·le, Stt·om Thunnan said on the Senate floor that 
t~cCone "epitorn) zes vthat has made America great." Hith friends 
like that, McCone did not need enemies. llis friends \<Je re not 
Kennedy's friends, and that says it all (Halbers t 1·am , 152- 153). 
The Joint Chi efs exerted virtually no referent power over 
thE! admin istNti on. Genet·ul 1·1ax\'Jell Taylor, who ~1 as Chainnan of 
the Joint Chi efs, possessed some personal inf'luence (Halberstram, 
162) ~ but v1 as overshadoi'led by the 1 ess subtle and impressive 
membel~s of the Staff. The President vi e1·1ed the military as 
insens iti ve to the forces of world pol itics and was appa ll ed by 
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their narr~~ military parochialism. An example of the insensi-
tivity with vthich the military vim·ted the international scene 
is provided by the voca 1 Air Force Chief, Curtis Let·1ay. On 
Sunday, October 28, after the Russians had agreed to \'li thdra\~ 
their missiles, he urged the President to 11 attack ~1onday in any 
case 11 (R. Kennedy, 118-120 and Allison, 206). 
FollO\~ing the \'leak performance of Dean Rusk and the State 
Department, the President•s confidence and trust of Rusk slipped 
badly (Hilsman, 1971, 163-164). Rusk 1 s conception of his role 
and his total lack of 11 Kennedy style" sepatated him from the 
President's circle of friends. Unlike MacNamara, Sorensen, or 
Bundy, John Kennedy could never bring himself to call Rusk by 
his first name . John Kennedy and Dean Rusk vtet·e not on the same 
\'lavel ength at all (Halberstramt 343-346). 
A final word about Adlai Stevenson: Stevenson labored under 
the additional burden ot· being regarded as weak and indecisive 
l>y the Kenr.edys. He \'las the subject of 11 thinly veiled contempt" 
by the l~hite House and of humiliating jokes about his indecisive-
ness . He was someone "to t ake Jacki e to the theatre" (Halber~ 
stram, 26~ 28). Ped1aps Kennedy \~oul d have been less hm·sh on a 
man he did not find so contemptible. 
Picture how things must have looked t o Pres ident Kennedy 
return-ing the evening of Hednesday , October 17. :~a cNama l~a had 
swung over in support of the blockade. He had received strong 
support frorn the P1~es i dent 1 s brother Hho used mora·l arg uments 
about \·that a Pres i dent could nnd could not do. F·inallyr Sorensen 
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added his support. Against the President's 11band of brothers 11 
was Acheson, an ex-Secretary of State \'Jho reflected to the cold 
warrior \·ling of the party. There \'las McCone, the conservative 
friend of Strom Thurmond, et cetera. There were the Joint Chiefs, 
who really \'/anted an all-out invasion. And there was Rusk, who 
\'las more indecisive than convinced. Bundy's presence in the air 
strike camp \'las the one advantage in terms of referent po'I'Jer 
they had. And it took a 11 day Thursday and heavy pressure Friday , 
but he too was finally won over (Allison, 206-207). Given the 
pO\'Ier of identification to induce change in personal beliefs 
and gi ven the strength of the referent power operating in favor 
of the blockade, there is little doubt that J ohn Kennedy acted 
with his advisors' advice and consent. 
Legitimate Power 
Exerci se of l egitimate pm'ler is a natural assumed function 
of the man who is President. His orders and his decisions are 
accepted with littl e questioning. Acheson never had any 
i 11 us ions about Hho made the fin a 1 decision. And yet» even the 
legitimnte pm·mr of the President is not a pov1er that can be 
taken for granted. 
The military responded to the Presidenti al decision by 
pled3ing t o loyally can·y out hi s o1·ders. Hhat the military did 
\'laS blatantly ignore a Presidential o1·der. The President ordered 
the blockade line to be moved from BOO mi l es out to 500 miles out 
to pr-ovide the Russians \'li t h more time for· decision. In a classic 
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example of the \•/eakness of legitimate po\'ler, Secl-etary MacNamara 
confronted Naval Chief of Operations Anderson at the war room in 
the Pentagon. Foll~~ing a heated exchange about the operation, 
Anderson ended the conversation by saying, "Now Mr. Secretar·y, if 
you and your Deputy \'li 11 go back to your offices, the Navy wi 11 
run the blockade." · As evidence novt makes clear, the Navy ran 
the blockade 800 miles out, 1~hich \~as in di rect contradiction 
with a Presidential cotrmand (Allison, 130-131) . 
The explanation is that the legitimate po\'mr of the President 
was limited. Presidential operation in the missile crisis over-
stepped the bounds of legitimate Presidential power in the eyes 
of the military in two ways. First, the Pr·esident ignored the 
hallowed tradition and the basis of militar·y command , the chain of 
command, by communi eating orders directly to officers on ships at 
sea. Second, the President \'las making tactical decisions about 
loca.l matters \·Jhich are the unquestioned right of local commanders 
onlyo Even top generals and admirals do not question the local 
battl efi eld judgment of the commander in chat·ge. By overstepping 
the l egitime1te reach of his po·det·, the Pres ident could not count 
on tile unquest-ioned obedience of the milita l~y (Allisonp 129-132) • 
• E xe.c:_':t_l>_9yte!:. 
Expet·t poi>/el" in c ludes the control of individual sk·in and 
i.tbi1ity as wen as the control ove r information. \·Je have <>'~ready 
sec~n heM the skills of "genet·a·lists11 l ·ike ~1ac.:Narna l'a, Robert 
Kennedy, Sorensen, Bundy, and Acheson had become highly prized 
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fo 11 o;.ri ng the Bay of Pigs. McCone and the Joint Chiefs, by 
comparison, were the institutional incarnations of the expertise 
now so distrusted. The President was openly skeptical~ for 
examp 1 e, about Lel~ay • s assertion that the Soviets \'toul d blandly 
accept an American invasion of Cuba (R. Kennedy, 36). 
Hhile the pm'ler that comes from being an "expert" may have 
been reduced in the aftermath of the [3ay of Pigs, the power 
h'hich comes from the contl'Ol of information remained a constant. 
~1acNamara particularly excelled in the use of facts, figures, 
and kno.'lledge (Halberstram, 234-235 and Hilsman, 1967, 43-44). 
Uis early argument that the missiles did not pose a significant 
military threat may have been impressive, but ExCom \'laS not 
dealing with matters governed by quantifiable facts. ExCom \'Jas 
persuaded net by the alternation of military ba·lance, but by 
damage to United States prestige. MacNamara could not use his 
fac~s and statistics to refute this cn~gument (GeO\'ge , 92). In 
shot't, the response to l~ucNamara's control of information was to 
go around it by raising issues about which quantification was not 
avail ab lc:. 
\~h en 1 ·1adlamal~a turned instead to support of the b 1 ocko.de, 
his \'las not Robert Kennedy's moY'al argument, but first and fore-
most an argument based on one critical piece of information. The 
Joint Chiefs had advi sed the President thnt a surgical a.it~ strike--
one which would only take out the offensive missiles - -was 
11 milii:arily infeas·ible." The Joint Chiefs instaad attempted to 
limit that option by pushing their own option f0r an ai r strike 
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of virtually all military installations and eventually an invasion 
(Gelb and Halperin, 30-31 and R. Kennedy, 34). 
This infonnation had a p01·1erful influence contrary to the 
hope of the military. The military hoped the information would 
serve to limit the air strike option and thus pave the way for 
the more dramatic military invasion. It is, of cou1"Se, a classic 
example of the idea of limiting options through expert power that 
Halperin outlined. Hhat the information did do was to eliminate 
· the air strike option and thus pave the \>Jay for the blockade. The 
military v-tas too i nsensi ti ve to see what they were doing in their 
insistence that a surgical air strike was impossible (Allison, 206). 
The po\'tel" of the information is implied by Acheson, who 
complained late \~ that 11 the na\"rO\'t and specific proposal" he favored 
"became obscured and complicated by the trimmings added by the 
militar-y 11 (Acheson, 76) . I Hould call un invasion a little more 
than trimmings , but the point is that military contr·ol of informa-
tion provided some control over options (Ge lb and Halperin , 30). 
Allison wr·ites that the information was wholly inaccur·ate 
and that such an air strike was in fac t fe asible. No one in 
ExCom , hm·.'ever, ques tioned the expert judgment of the mi 1itar·y . 
Civili an l eaders, unaccustomed to examin ing the details of 
mil-i tary pl ans, di d not question ~!!l..l an air strike must be followed 
by att acking ail m"ilitat·y install ations nnd eventual ly an invasion. 
The virtually unquesti oning acceptance of the expert advice of the 
Joint Chiefs suggests that the Admini stration learned its l esson 
only pa~tly (Alli son, 124-126 and 205 and Sorensen, 1965 , 691-697 ). 
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In sunmary, r~acNamat·a and Bundy's abandonment of non-military 
options \'las a result of the reward and referent power exercised by 
a determined President and the weakness of MacNamara•s expert 
powel' in a non-quantitative argument. The choice of the blockade 
by the President \'las largely the result of superior referent 
powet· exercised by the a 11 i ance of Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, and 
~1acNamara . The blockade received further substantial assistance 
by the military 1 s unvritting pt·ovision of information indicating 
the military infeasibility of the ail' strike alternative. 
A number of unansvtered questions remain: ( 1) Hhy did John 
Kennedy exet·cise power on behalf of military options so early? 
(2) Hhy v1as the advice of the mil'itary accepted \tlithout questioning 
by a group Ol''i gi nally favornb ly dis posed to the b ·1 udgeoned 
a1temative? The contras t between the consensus- laden aura of the 
Bay of Pigs and the open conflict of the missile cris i s sug9ests 
CJ. final questi on: \'Jhy \'las power exercised more freely and open ly 
in the missile cri sis? For an answer to these ques tions, we turn 
to an exami nati on of the perceptions and expectations of the decision-
rno.ki ng group. 
Courage is the t hing. All goes if courage 
goes. 
-Sir James 13arri e 
Li ke the knights of yore which Rarrie brings to mind , John 
Kennedy ScM h·i s cnuraqe being challenged by the Red Knight 
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Khrushchev banishing a silver missile. Feeling his courage and 
will challenged by the old man who bullied him at Vienna and 
feeling pressured at home by opponents to live up to his rhetoric, 
John Kennedy entered the arena svtinging (George, 98-99 and Halton, 
103-120). 
The Realization of the Opportunitx to Exercise Power 
The perceptions of the Kennedy administration of the events 
of early October operated to 1 imi t opportunities for pol'ter uti 1 i-
zation. Viewing the world through their particular perspective, 
the Kennedy administration hardly considered the non-military 
options. Three forces shaped the perception which 1 imi ted the 
choices. 
(1) . The administration vieHed the \1/0l·ld through red, white, 
and blue glasses. The strong anti -communism of John Kennedy was 
less warlike than that of Acheson, but still 1"el11Jtithin the 
bounds of Cold \-Jar tradition (Fulbri ght, S29). Kennedy's campaign 
rhetoric and his foreign policy reflected an ant i ~ corm1unist feeling 
of which the 13ay of Pigs is but one example (Halton, 3··10 and 202-
234). 
(2). Hhile Kennedy 1 s policy attitudes tnay have stl'add1ed the 
1 i ne bebteen Acheson and Stevenson, his method of opel~ati on \~as 
the hard- liner Aches on approach. The drive for toughness, the 
maschi smo quality, the determination, all in ct·eased follm~ing the 
fa illlres in Cuba and Vi enna. John Kennedy's rhetor·ic reflected 
his drive for military strength and determin«tion and his 
stereotypical view of the Soviets in an aggressive position. 
Sure, he wanted peace and non-aggression, but the Soviets had 
to be sho;-m he could be tough, too (Eckhardt and Hhite, 238). 
Cold warrior Joseph Alsop rejoicing in Kennedy's Stevenson image 
and his Acheson toughness said after his election: "Isn't he 
marvelous? A Stevenson with balls" (Halberstram, 24). 
( 3). /1 third force shaping the perception of the October 
crisis wcs the vtatchful eye of the voter. \~ith the election 
in November, the public was watching as Republicans gleefully 
tutned the tables on Kennedy who had attacked Nixon so hard on · 
Cuba in 1960 (Abel, 12-13) . Senators Keating, Capehart , Thurman, 
and Goldwater \'/ere needling the administration of the rumore d 
pres~nce of Sovi et missiles on Cuba. The needle drew blood. 
Since tile Bay of Pi gs, Cuba had been t he administration's ''heavi est 
political cross " and in 1962~ the Republican Conqress ionul campai gn 
corr:mittee pronounced Cuba to be the 11 domina.nt i ssue 11 of the 
campaign (Sorensen, 1965, 669). In response to this pressuring 
Kennedy i ssued statements on September 4 and 13 \•Jarning that the 
United States \'IOuld not tolerate the introduct ion of offensive 
weapons into Cuba (Wal ton, 108; George , 91; and text s in Larson, 
3-4 and 15- 16 ) ~ 
These forces shaped the Pres ident 's perception of the 11 Cri si s" 
from the velA.Y beg inning. Kennedy ' s initi al response \'lhcn told 
of the m·issiles \'las anger. He was 11 furious" at having been 
deceived (Sch les inger, 80 1-802 ) . Robert Kennedy echoed the feeling 
of ange \~ed bet1·aya l to an aide the next day= 11 He kidded ourselves, 
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the Russians have lied in their teeth" (Guthman, 118). The 
feeling of having been bet~ayed and tricked produced similar 
shock and anger among other members of ExCom (R. Kennedy, 27 
and Walton, 117). 
After the initial shock, Kennedy's more reflective feeling 
was that this was the challenge he had been expecting Khrushchev 
to make since Vienna. He felt that he now faced the "supreme 
risk 11 that l'tas necessary fot· him to face in order to convince 
Khr·ushchev of his determination. To convince Khrushchev, Kennedy 
could not use words; "he has to see you move," the President told 
a reporter in the aftermath of Vienna (George, 99 and Walton, 118-
119). Accordingly, Kennedy decided early aga·inst non-military 
alternatives. As Robert Kennedy remembers , "He knew he \\'Ould 
have to act •••• Hhat that action would be \·tas s ti 11 to be deter-
mined. But hH Has convinced from the beginning that he \-Joul d 
have to do someth·inq" (R. Kennedy, 33). That action \'tas military 
action, as the President made clear at the first meeting on 
Tuesday. 
The desire fOl'" military action was supported by the politics 
of that Octobe1·. On the fi l'St Tuesday~ hf~ sent for· a copy of his 
earlier statements on Cuba. These statements "made it unlikely 
that he \voul d respond" by anything short of mi 1 i taty act ion 
(Sorensen, 1965, 34- 45 ) . Thus, did the considerations of high 
strategy (must impress Khrushchev) and of politics (must i mpress 
voters ) r-trin force each other· to 1·ul e out all alternatives shor·t 
of mi"litary nct·ion (Steel, 219~220) . 
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The feeling that he \'Jas responding to a challenge to his 
courage is reflected in the President's announcement of the 
blockade. Kennedy placed great stress on the .. deliberate decep· 
tion and offensive threats 11 of the Soviet move. Kennedy then 
tenned the action a 11 deliberately provocative and unjustified 
change in the stat us ~ v1hi ch cannot be accepted ••• if £!:!!. 
~~and conrnitment are ever to be trusted again .. (in Larson, 
41-46). "Our courage"··~hovl much it sounds 1 ike the fears of 
being 11soft" rather than .. really tough 11 which \'/ere expressed in 
the Bay of Pigs. Even poor, soft Adlai Stevenson \·las pressed 
into service to del i ver a tough, White House- supervised attack 
on the Russians in the United Nations. Stevenson attacked the 
Soviet "nuclear decei t 11 so hard one almost \'/Onders whether the 
missiles bothered anyone at all (in l arson, 137-141). 
John Kennedy ' s ·; nterpretati on \.,ras 1 argely shared by those 
membet-s of Ex Com who eventually s uppor·ted the b 1 ockade. The 
Joint Chi efs' v·iew of the event 1.,ras even more strikingly anti-
communist and tough-minded. The Chiefs vi ewed the missiles as 
an opportunity to l aunch the invasion to get rid of Castro, 
which they had wanted since before the Bay of Pigs. Their single~ 
minded devotion to this alternative explains the insensitivity 
that led them to bludgeon the air stri ke option they woul d have 
p1·eferred to the b1ock ade. The militaty ' s inabil i ty to see the 
consequences of thei r action illustrates how easily our interpre-
tation of events can distort our judgment and preclude the exercise 
of power on behalf of options we prefer (All ison, 123- 126 and 206 
B4 
and Halperin, 1971, 74-76). 
In short, the perception of John Kennedy resulted in an 
interpretation of events which ruled out the use of power on 
behalf of non-military alternatives. The perception of the 
Joint Chiefs resulted in an interpretation of events \'lhich 
ruled out the non-invasion alternatives. In their zeal the 
military also ruled out the only viable alternative to the 
blockade they opposed so strongly. 
The Appropri ateness of the Exercise of Power 
While the limiting of options was taking place, the atmos-
phere of the group a 11 0\'ied substantia 1 freedom to appropriately 
exercise pov1er on behalf of those t\>IO options \l'hich remained • 
. ~ti_qt~e~~~-· The group etiquette required a more open 
exe1Acise of fJO\tler among equals. The criticism of alternatives 
v1as encouraged as appropri ate hehavi or· by the group. It \'laS as 
though a group nonn had developed appt~oving crit·icism in the 
aftermath of the Bay of Pi gs (Jani s, 1972, 149-·150). There 
is vii despread agreement <1mong the participants that the meetings 
wet~ open cl ashes of opinion among 11 equals" (Sch1esinger, 802-
803; Aches on, 46; R. Kennedy, 46; and Sorensen , 1965, 679). 
Of cour:;et as Acheson does note, the members of t he group 
were not equa 1 in terms of power. Rather~ they '\·Jer·e equa 1 in 
the sense that no individua·l assumed the posH·ion or role 
"- - ---
of a leade1· or othen-li se exerci sed authority of position. For 
example, Paul Nitze openly clashed with his superior , Robert 
85 
MacNamara at the opening of the first meeting (George, 92). 
Roles. The limitations of roles operated to reduce effective 
po\'ler in tv.1o cases and to expand it in one. Dean Rusk's role 
concept of the Secretary of State as the personal advisor of the 
President had the disadvantage of seriously limiting his influence. 
Rusk attempted to follow in the footsteps of his mentor, George 
Marsha 11. but he did not have r~arsha 11' s reputation, v1hi ch provided 
!1arshall' s pov1er base. The result vtas that Dean Rusk had little 
effect on the outcome (Halberstram, 344 and Hilsman , 1971, 169). 
McGeorge Bundy's role of mediator seeing that every option 
was heard may account for his strange behavior. Initi ally 
supporting a diplomati c approach , t hen switching to the air strike, 
and then s l ov1 ly and hesitantly mo ving into the blockade camp, Bundy 
may have been actin g out his role by seeing that every v ·ie~tJ was 
exarr~i ned. 11 1 almost del iberate ly stayed in the minori ty, .. he 
recalls. 11 1 fe'lt Vf':i"Y st1·ongly that it was very important to keep 
the President's choices open 11 (Anderson, 324~325 ). Hhile I am 
uncomfortab le vlith attributing such control and ca·lculation t o a 
decision-maker during a ct•i s is , Bundy ' s ro 1 e certainly 1 i mi ted hi s 
power to advocate any one option. He, of course , exerci sed a 
pm"'er in the direction of free options as a goal . 
Finally, the role of the Joi nt Chiefs as t he sol e and 
unquest·ioned providers of nri l ita1Ay judgments was a strong one. 
The dil emma facing civilians \llhen faced with military judgments 
is t1·10fo l d: f i rst , thete are few al ternative soul'ces of i nforma-
tion and udvi ce on military matters; and second, the prestige and 
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influence of the military on 1 cadi ng members of Congress makes 
rejection of their advice a dangerous course (Halperin, 1972, 
310-311). The acceptance of the military role suggests that the 
Kennedy administration may have learned not to trust experts, 
but not how to go about it. 
- . 
Task/Interpersonal Orientation. The interpersonal orienta-
tion of the group during the Bay of Pigs \!las rep 1 aced by a task 
orientation of the ExCom. Three forces operated to alter the 
orientation of the group. First, over time the group sought a 
balance of orientation . Hith a previously heavy interpe1·sona·1 
orientat ion , the group sought the balance necessary for cohes ive-
ness by instituting greater task emphasis. Second, follO\·ling 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy administration came under 
heavy a.nd continuous political attack for its handling of the 
operation. External criticism of an interpersona lly ori ented 
group's faflure \'Jill tesult in a greater task orientation. Third, 
t he miss-ile crisis \'tas a period of greater stress than the Bay of 
Pigs. The stress faced by the ExCom could be expected to increase 
task orientation. Thus, we can expect the ExCom to have operated 
in a manner more indi cative of task orientation. 
As has been noted earlier, task ori entation i s characterized 
by cl ear power differenti als and a critical focus on the job at 
hand. As we have seen, the etiquette of the ExCom refl ected the 
ch a\~acteristi cs of task emphasis. Janis sees the more open and 
critical approach of ExCom to be the result of a qroup norm that 
i s the l egacy of the Bay of Pigs. I offer an expl anation of the 
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force behind that norm: the task orientation resulting from 
external criticism of an interpersonal orientation. 
The Desirability to Exercise Power 
A focus upon the task, especially so important a task, 
provides the individual \'lith greater desire to exercise power. 
An interpersonal orientation pits the desire to move the group 
to.1ards a pal·ticular policy option against the larger priority 
of maintaining close interpersonal relationships. A task 
orientation poses no confl ·ict for the individual since the 
desire to move the gl~oup tovtards a parti cul al· po 1 icy option 
is consistent vtith the priority of solving the pl·oblem at hand. 
Robert Kennedy said, 11 Each one of us was being asked to make 
a recommendntion whi ch v10uld affect the futw·e of all mankind, 
C.l. 1·econrnendation Hhi ch, if vtrong and if accepted, could mean 
tile destruct-ion of the human race 11 (R. Kennedy~ 44). In shor·t, 
they took t he responsibility to act because of the Sel~ious 
consequences of inaction. They believed it mattered how they 
chose •. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The successful application of the facts, as we knm'l them, 
regarding the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis into a 
theory of group decision-making supports the theory. The process 
model seems to be an adequate tool for understanding the events 
surrounding these t\'IO deci s·ions. 
1·1oreover, it is difficult to understand how an analysis of 
these decisions could reasonably i gnore the factors isolated 
in the process mode 1. Does the Bay of Pigs deci s ion make sense 
without an unders tanding of the CIA's exercise of oower? Does 
the s i1 ence of other potent ia 1 pov1er exercisers make sense 
without the concepts of etiquette, roles, and interpet-sonal 
o t'i<~ntations? Does the reference pm·H~r of blockade suppot•ters 
aiel in the understanding of how the blockade alternative v-tas 
adopted? Does the open conf lict of the missile crisis deci si on 
group make sense in contras t vii th the ass umed consensus of the 
Bay of Pigs group \<J i thout an un derstanding of i nterpersona 1 
perceptions? In sho rtt the answer I would provide is that 
poli tical decisions cnn be understood only by vi ewi ng the process 
of how they evo l ved. 
~--· . 
The limitations of avai l ab le f acts pose serious cha l lenges 
fot' someone attempting a process analysis. The dominance of the 
"rational actor model" as the mode of political analysis leads 
ins·idm~s to wri te not of the detn"il s of t he deci s·ion process, but 
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of the reasons for the decision. In short, the details of who 
said what to \·thorn and vii th \'lhat impact are often overlooked. 
But the dominance of the "rational actor model" has its advan-
tages. Not recognizing the importance of the details of decision 
process, sympathetic insiders \'lill often betray themselves by 
disclosing \•lh at they think of as a hannless detail. For example, 
the disclosure by Sorensen and Schl esi nger of the perceived 
threat to the Kennedy image of toughnes s and determination posed 
by inaction in either the Bay of Pigs or the Cuban l~ i s sile Crisis 
is a little- noticed det ail of great importance if seen within the 
framework of the process model . Rega1·dless of hov1 many such 
detail s exist, we will probab ly wish to remain open to future data. 
Accordingly, no analysis can ever be final in the sense of being 
cloc;ed t o future t~evisions or changes. The real question is 
whether enough informat·ion exis ts to n1ake a prof i table anal ys is. 
I think enough i nfor·mation exi s ts on t he deci s ions di scussed he t·e. 
The Bay of Pins anti the Cuban l~i ss il e crisi s decisions indicate 
th at Presidents, like other mortals , are subject to power exerci se 
und perceptual l imitations. The i mage of the l onely President paci ng 
outside the F1·ench windov1s of the l~lhite House deciding in sol i t ude 
the fate of the world i s a fal se image. Pres idents decide in 
crO\'Idedt smoke .. f ill ed rooms j ust like other mortals. Presi dents 
cxerdse pm'ier by vi rtuc of t he·i r posi t·i on and the re\'Jards and 
puni shments t hat position grants t hem. Pres idents al so exercise 
powe r based on the i r personalities and ski ll s . And, of course , 
Presidents arc subject to t he pm,te t· exercised by their advi sors . 
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They decide \'lith their ·advisors 1 advice and consent. 
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